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I. Introduction
Traditionally, the power of the state has included the power to
commit mentally ill citizens to psychiatric hospitals against their
will.' The state's authority to confine the mentally ill rests upon two
distinct legal doctrines: parens patriae and police power. Under its
parens patriae authority, the state acts on behalf of certain individuals
who are believed incapable of acting in their own best interest.2
The police power authorizes the state to confine certain persons for
prevention of harm to the community. 3
t This research was supported by grant ROIMH36220 from the Center for Studies
on Antisocial and Violent Behavior of the National Institute of Mental Health.
* Ph.D. Oklahoma. Assistant Professor, Department of Health Services, School of
Public Health and Community Medicine, University of Washington; Associate Director,
Center for Health Studies, Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound.
** B.A., J.D. Yale University. Professor of Law, University of Puget Sound School
of Law.
The authors gratefully acknowledge the invaluable research assistance of Harold D
Carr, J.D., Research Associate, Department of Health Services, University of Washing-
ton, and Theresa McManus, a student at the University of Puget Sound School of Law.
1. S. BRAKEL & R. ROCK, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW, 1-13 (rev. ed. 1971);
Developments in the Law - Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1190, 1207-
10 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Developments - Civil Commitment].
2. See generally, La Fond, An Examination of the Purposes of Involuntary Civil Commitment,
30 BUFFALO L. REV. 499 (1981) [hereinafter cited as La Fond, Purposes of Commitment] and
Developments - Civil Commitment, supra note 1.
3. See La Fond, Purposes of Commitment, supra note 2. Criteria in commitment statutes
based on police power range from the very general criteria, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAws §40.1-
5-7 (1984) ("person . . . in need of immediate care and treatment and is one whose
continued unsupervised presence in the community would create an imminent likeli-
hood of serious harm . . ."); to requiring evidence of specific past conduct, e.g., PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §7301(B) (Purdon Supp. 1985) (clear and present danger to self or
others shown by establishing that within the past thirty days the person inflicted or at-
tempted to inflict serious bodily harm and such behavior will probably recur, or is un-
able to avoid serious physical debilitation); or requiring that it be more likely than not
that the person will cause serious bodily harm to self or others in the near future. e.g..
N.M. STAT. ANN. §43-1-3(M) (Supp. 1984).
395
Yale Law & Policy Review
Over the last two decades, involuntary civil commitment of the
mentally ill has provoked heated public controversy. The debate
has raged with special intensity because it implicates competing
political ideologies, 4 moral values, 5 decision-making models, 6 and
claims of expertise.7 At its extreme, the debate over civil commit-
ment has focused on whether the state should continue to use its
power of coercion to deprive mentally ill persons of their liberty, or
whether involuntary civil commitment should be abolished in favor
of other systems of social control and care." The middle ground of
the debate has centered on whether the state, in committing individ-
uals involuntarily, should do so under its police power 9 or its parens
patriae power, '0 and on how legal regimes" should define, delegate,
and control such state authority.
4. See, e.g.,T. SZASZ, LAW, LIBERTY, AND PSYCHIATRY (1963);T. SZASZ, THE MYTH OF
MENTAL ILLNESS (rev. ed. 1974). "Political ideologies" in this context refers to the pref-
erences citizens have either for the state to act coercively against an individual in order
to maximize public safety and welfare, or for the state to maximize individual autonomy
and minimize state intervention into the lives of its citizens.
5. Compare, e.g., Szasz, Theology of Therapy: The Breach of the First Amendment Through the
Medicalization of Morals, 5 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 127 (1975) with Chodoff, The
Case for Involuntary Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill, 133 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 496 (1976).
"Moral values" in this context refers to the sense of obligation based on an ethical sense
of rightness that each citizen has either to act paternalistically to help one whom he feels
cannot help himself or, in the alternative, to respect the expressed choices of another as
a legitimate assertion of individual autonomy.
6. Compare, e.g., Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and
remanded, 414 U.S. 473 (1974), order on remand, 379 F. Supp. 1376 (1974), vacated and
remanded on other grounds, 421 U.S. 957 (1975), order reinstated on remand, 413 F. Supp. 1318
(1976) with Parham v.J.L. and J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (Opinion of Chief Justice Bur-
ger). "Decision-making models" here refers to the choice between an adversarial-accu-
satorial system of adjudication such as that which prevails in America and an
inquisitorial-administrative system of adjudication generally preferred both by Euro-
pean continental legal systems and by many medical professionals.
7. Compare, e.g., Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping
Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 693 (1974) with Appelbaum & Hamm, Decision to
Seek Commitment, 39 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY 447 (1982). "Claims of expertise" relates in
part to whether mental health professionals are competent to diagnose mental illness
and to predict future human behavior with any degree of validity and/or reliability.
8. See, e. g., Morse, A Preference for Liberty: The Case Against Involuntary Commitment of the
Mfentally Disordered, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 54 (1982).
9. See La Fond, Purposes of Commitment, supra note 2; Comment, Overt Dangerous Behav-
ior as a Constitutional Requirement for Involuntary Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 44 U.
CHI. L. REV. 562 (1977); Ennis & Litwack, supra note 7; Herman, Preventive Detention, A
Scientific View of Man and State Power, 1973 U. ILL. L. F. 673. See also supra note 3 and
accompanying text (discussion of the police power).
10. See, e.g., Morse, supra note 8; Livermore, Malmquist & Meehl, On the Justifica-
tions for Civil Commitment, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 75 (1968); La Fond, Purposes of Commitment,
supra note 2. See also supra notes 2-9 and accompanying text (discussion of the parens
patriae power).
11. "Legal regimes" refers to the system for civil commitment of the mentally ill
provided by the legal system. As noted above, see supra note 1, only the state has the




The historical context of this debate is important. In the 1960's
and early 1970's, public opinion shifted abruptly from wide-spread
support of extensi,e civil commitment to support of significant lim-
its on the state's commitment authority. As a consequence of
changed attitudes, important legislative changes were made in state
commitment systems. "Medical" models of civil commitment,
which conferred broad authority on mental health experts to hospi-
talize coercively persons they deemed mentally ill and in need of
hospitalization, were changed drastically in favor of "legal" models
of commitment. Under a "medical" model a medical specialist, such
as a psychiatrist, has broad authority under the law to evaluate and
hospitalize a patient he finds mentally ill and in need of treatment.
Under a "legal" model, significant substantive and procedural safe-
guards limit the authority of medical specialists to commit persons
deemed mentally ill.12
Several potent forces propelled this move from the medical model
to the legal model of commitment. First, there was increased recog-
nition that commitment to a mental hospital entailed a serious loss
of liberty even if undertaken for an apparently benign purpose.' 3
Moreover, enhanced public awareness of the stark conditions ex-
isting in state mental health facilities raised the question of whether
confinement to such facilities might make patients worse off than if
the state had not committed them.' 4 The increased emphasis on
more protective criminal procedures for criminals and juveniles sen-
sitized courts to the absence of any meaningful legal protection in
the mental health commitment processes of most states.15 Develop-
ments in constitutional jurisprudence enunciating rights to make
decisions concerning one's own body influenced public attitudes
about the privacy of such decisions. 16 Finally, many problems inher-
ent in the medical or "therapeutic" model came to light, including
the opportunities it created for unlimited application and for
abuse. 17
illness. Consequently this authority must be asserted through the law, whether in statu-
tory or other form, which confers power on designated individuals and provides the
necessary arrangements for decision-making.
12. For an excellent discussion of these models, see Morse, supra note 8, at 54-57.
13. Developments - Civil Commitment, supra note 1, at 1193, 1272.
14. See Morse, supra note 8, at 80.
15. See D. WEXLER, MENTAL HEALTH LAw: MAJOR ISSUES 13 (1981) [hereinafter cited
as D. WEXLER, MENTAL HEALTH LAw]; Wexler, Token and Taboo: Behavior Modification,
Token Economies and the Law, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 81 (1973).
16. Developments - Civil Commitment, supra note 1, at 1195-97 n. 12 and sources cited
therein.
17. D. WEXLER, MENTAL HEALTH LAw, supra note 15, at 14-29.
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During this period many states thoroughly revised their commit-
ment laws by providing additional procedural protections and by
adopting more restrictive substantive criteria for commitment.' 8
Strong evidence suggests, however, that today the pendulum of
public attitudes and state policy is swinging again toward the medi-
cal model. At least four states, including Washington, have recently
revised their commitment statutes by changing the substantive crite-
ria for commitment to expand the scope of the state's authority to
hospitalize coercively persons deemed mentally ill. 19 There is also
increasing public agitation for adoption of statutes that return more
power to mental health professionals to confine mentally ill persons
against their will. 20 Much of this agitation is based on the claim,
usually made by psychiatrists, that restrictive state commitment stat-
utes operate to deprive many mentally ill persons of essential thera-
peutic services that could humanely and effectively treat their illness
and thereby substantially improve their well-being.2'
The American Psychiatric Association has proposed a Model State
18. See, e.g., Lanterman-Petris-Short Act, CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§5000-5400
(West 1984); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123 (West Supp. 1985) (1970 enactment
adopted stringent commitment standards), see Walker, Mental Health Law Reform in Mas-
sachusetts, 53 B.U.L. REV. 986, 988 (1973); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §5122.01-.99 (Page
1981) (1976 enactment imposed more specific and restrictive criteria for civil commit-
ment), see The New Ohio Mental Health Act, 11 AKRON L. REV. 104 (1977); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 50 §7301 (Purdon Supp. 1983) (well-defined, restrictive standards enacted in 1976
after 1966 legislation was declared unconstitutional), see Note, Standards for Involuntary
Civil Commitment in Pennsylvania, 38 Prr. L. REV. 535, 547-49 (1977). See generally
Schwitzgebel, Survey of State Commitment Statutes, in CIVIL COMMITMENT AND SOUND POLICY
47, 53 (A. McGarry et. al. eds. 1981).
19. Alaska has recently expanded its statutory definition of "gravely disabled" to
include persons who as a result of mental illness will, if not treated, suffer distress which
impairs judgment, reason or behavior, "causing a substantial deterioration of the per-
son's previous ability to function independently." ALAsw STAT. §47.30.915(7)(B)
(1984). North Carolina has expanded its definition of "danger to self" to include an
inability to exercise self-control, judgment, and discretion in daily responsibilities or
social relations, and has enacted a statutory presumption that patients are unable to care
for themselves if they engage in grossly emotional or inappropriate behavior or display
other signs of severely impaired insight and judgment. N.C. GEN. STAT. §122-
58.2(1981). In 1983, Texas revised its commitment law to permit commitment of a per-
son who "will, if not treated, continue to suffer severe and abnormal mental, emotional,
or physical distress and will continue to experience deterioration of his ability to func-
tion independently and is unable to make a rational and informed decision as to whether
or not to submit to treatment." TEX. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-50(b)(2)(iii) (Vernon Supp.
1985). See also infra notes 89-99 and accompanying text (description of how Washington
revised its civil commitment statute).
20. See infra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
21. See, e.g., Chodoff, supra note 5; Slovenko, Civil Commitment in Perspective, 20J. PUB.
L. 3 (1971), Katz, The Right to Treatment - An Enchanting Legal Fiction?, 36 U. Cm. L. REV.
755 (1969), Davidson, Mental Hospitals and the Civil Liberties Dilemma, 51 MENTAL HYGIENE
371 (1967); Treffert, Dying with Their Rights On, 130 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1041 (1973);





Commitment Statute which gives significant weight to the parens pa-
triae interest of the state.2 2 Under this statute a person may be invol-
untarily admitted to a treatment facility for a brief period of
emergency evaluation and treatment if, inter alia, the examining phy-
sician concludes that the person is suffering from a severe mental
disorder and, as a result of such disorder, is incapable of making an
informed treatment decision and is likely to suffer substantial
mental deterioration. 23 The statute also authorizes commitment for
an additional 30 days if, inter alia, a court in a judicial hearing based
on medical testimony concludes that the person continues to suffer
from a severe mental disorder and without treatment is likely to suf-
fer severe mental deterioration. 24 The commentary to the model
statute indicates clearly that the intent of the drafters is to permit
commitment of many citizens who are not presently commitable under
current legal standards.2 5
In the continuing controversy over civil commitment, tremendous
energy has been expended arguing about the appropriate wording
22. See Stromberg & Stone, A Model State Law on Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 20
HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 275 (1983).
23. In Section 4, the statute permits an examining psychiatrist to confine a person in
an evaluation and treatment facility if he determines that: "the person suffers from a
severe mental disorder as the result of which: he lacks capacity to make an informed
decision concerning treatment; and he is (a) likely to cause harm to himself or to suffer
substantial mental or physical deterioration, or (b) likely to cause harm to others; and imme-
diate hospitalization is necessary to prevent such harm." (emphasis added.) Id. at 321.
In its "definitions" section 3, the statute specifies that: "likely to cause harm to himself
or to suffer substantial mental or physical deterioration, means that, as evidenced by recent
behavior, the person (1) is likely in the near future to inflict substantial physical injury
upon himself, or (2) is substantially unable to provide for some of his basic needs such
as food, clothing, shelter, health, or safety, or (3) will if not treated suffer or continue to
suffer severe and abnormal mental, emotional, or physical distress, and this distress is associated
with significant impairment ofjudgement, reason or behavior causing a substantial deterioration of his
previous ability to function on his own." (emphasis added) Id. at 302 and 303.
24. The Statute provides that an individual committed pursuant to a Section 4 emer-
gency procedure may be committed for an additional 30 days if the court in a judicial
hearing based on medical testimony determines under a "clear and convincing" eviden-
tiary standard that: "(1) the person is suffering from a severe mental disorder; and (2)
there is a reasonable prospect that his disorder is treatable at or through the facility to
which he is to be committed, and such commitment would be consistent with the least
restrictive alternative principle; and (3) the person either refuses or is unable to consent
to voluntary admission for treatment; and (4) the person lacks capacity to make an in-
formed decision concerning treatment; and (5) as the result of the severe mental disorder, the
person is (a) likely to cause harm to himself or to suffer substantial mental or physical deteriora-
tion, or (b) likely to cause harm to others." Id. at 330.
25. The commentary section, which is acknowledged as the "heart of the Model
Law," id. at 331, focuses on the need for treatment, the incapacity of the individual to
make a rational treatment decision, and the availability of treatment as the core require-
ments for civil commitment. It further states: "We believe that ... many severely dis-
ordered people who are not now committable as gravely disabled could be committed under
the Model Law." (emphasis added.) Id. at 335.
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of statutory criteria used to identify those persons who are subject
to involuntary civil commitment. 26 A basic assumption in this de-
bate appears to be that the particular language of statutory criteria
makes a significant difference in commitment practice. Previous em-
pirical studies have not provided a clear basis for testing this crucial
first premise, or for ascertaining what consequences, if any, might
follow from changing the statutory criteria for commitment to ex-
pand the scope of the state's commitment authority.2 7
In 1973, Washington enacted a restrictive civil commitment stat-
ute 28 which considerably narrowed the power of the state to confine
mentally ill persons against their will.29 In 1979, after public agita-
tion by mental health professionals and citizen advocacy groups, 30
Washington revised its civil commitment statute, greatly expanding
the civil commitment power of the state without significantly alter-
ing commitment procedures. 3' This dramatic change in a state's
mental health policy, and its implementation through revision of the
statutory criteria for commitment, provided a unique opportunity to
26. See, e.g., Dix, Major Current Issues Concerning Civil Commitment Criteria, 45 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 137 (Summer 1982) at 137; La Fond, Purposes of Commitment, supra note
2; Stromberg & Stone, supra note 22.
27. Compare, e.g., Haupt & Erlich, The Impact of a New State Commitment Law on Psychiat-
ric Patient Careers, 31 HosP. & COMM. PSYCHIATRY 745 (1980) (1976 Pennsylvania Mental
Health Procedure Act, containing more restrictive commitment criteria and more strin-
gent procedural due process than the prior commitment statute did not significantly
change the number or relative percentage of patients admitted voluntarily or involunta-
rily for the eight month period before and after the effective date of the statute nor did it
affect significantly the average length of stay for voluntary and involuntary patients) with
A. STONE, MENTAL HEALTH AND LAW: A SYSTEM IN TRANSITION 60-65 (1975) (suggests,
albeit with some reservations, that the enactment in 1969 of California's Lanterman-
Petris-Short Act, see supra note 18 and accompanying text, with its very restrictive com-
mitment criteria and substantially increased procedural due process accorded commit-
tees, resulted in reducing the average length of hospitalization for involuntary
committees; a significant number of patients could no longer be coercively committed to
the state's mental health system and have consequently found their way into the criminal
system). Some commentators have concluded that procedural changes in the commit-
ment process rather than substantive changes in the commitment criteria are more likely
to affect the likelihood of commitment and the structure of service delivery within the
involuntary commitment system. See Roth, supra note 21, at 391. There is evidence to
the contrary, however, which clearly suggests that procedural changes in a commitment
system are frequently and flagrantly disregarded by medical and judicial system partici-
pants. Comment, Involuntary Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill in Iowa: The Failure of the
1975 Legislation, 64 IowA L. REV. 1284 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Involuntary
Hospitalization].
28. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §71.05, et. seq. (West 1975) (enacted by Laws 1st Ex.
Sess. 1973, ch. 142; effectiveJan. 1, 1974) ("1973 ITA").
29. See infra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
31. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §71.05 et. seq. (West Supp. 1985) (enacted by Laws Ex.





conduct empirical research and to collect relevant data on the im-
pact of such changes on Washington's civil commitment system. In
1981, the National Institute of Mental Health funded a research pro-
ject to assess the impact of Washington's statutory change.32 This
project is the first empirical study to analyze systematically the con-
sequences that follow from revising the statutory commitment cri-
teria to expand the substantive authority of a state to confine
mentally ill persons against their will. The project's findings are the
focus of this article.
The data gathered from studying the Washington experience sup-
port the following conclusions: 1) persons were committed under
the new statutory commitment criteria substantially before the effec-
tive date of the statute;3 2) the number of patients committed invol-
untarily increased significantly, and many patients who had had no
previous contact with state hospitals were committed to psychiatric
facilities; 34 3) these new patients stayed in hospitals longer than
other patients and became chronic users of the state mental hospi-
tals; 35 4) the major state mental hospital became extremely over-
crowded and tried unsuccessfully to put a limit on new admissions; 36
5) voluntary patients were virtually excluded from state hospitals; 37
and 6) litigation outcomes in contested cases seem to have been af-
fected by structural arrangements for providing indigent persons
with legal representation at commitment hearings.
3 8
These findings pose serious concerns for mental health policy-
makers considering expanding the substantive power of the state to
commit, raise significant questions regarding the ability of both law
and the courts to control the bureaucrats to whom the coercive
power of the state has been delegated, and present issues of consti-
tutional dimension.
II. Involuntary Civil Commitment in Washington
A. The 1959 Civil Commitment Law
Prior to 1973, Washington's civil commitment law was fairly typi-
cal in its criteria for determining who could be subject to involun-
32. Durham, Legal Intervention in Involuntary Civil Commitment, Center for Studies on
Antisocial and Violent Behavior, N.I.M.H. Grant No. R01MH36220.
33. See infra notes 112-116 and 173-177 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 112-123 and 134-136 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 117-122 and 144-145 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 100-106 and 166-172 and accompanying text.
37. See infra notes 112-116 and 153-157 and accompanying text.
38. See infra notes 129-133 and 204-224 and accompanying text.
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tary hospitalization. Under the 1959 law, a peace officer or chief
medical officer of a licensed hospital could, in an emergency, appre-
hend or detain for 12 hours a person believed to be mentally ill and
dangerous to himself, others, or property.3 9 Within 12 hours of de-
tention, examination by a licensed physician was required. 40 If the
examining physician found him to be mentally ill, the individual
could be confined and treated in a hospital for up to 72 hours.4 1
In addition, any person could file a petition seeking non-emer-
gency commitment of the patient beyond the 72-hour period. 42
The superior court considered these petitions for involuntary hos-
pitalization as a matter of probate. 43  At a court hearing, at least
two licensed physicians who had examined the detainee were re-
quired to testify; the detainee could present his own evidence.44 At
the court's discretion, a guardian could be appointed to represent
the detainee, or he could be represented by counsel. 45 He also had
the right to a jury trial.46 If the court determined that the person
was mentally ill,4 7 it could order his commitment to a hospital.
4 8
While the statute is not entirely clear, it appears that the commit-
ment was indeterminate, without mandatory judicial review, and
that primary releasing authority was vested in the superintendent of
the hospital. 49
B. The 1973 Involuntary Treatment Act
In 1973, Washington enacted a revised civil commitment statute
that reflected a fundamental shift in commitment philosophy toward
the "legal" model. 50 This new statute drastically limited the scope
39. Act of March 19, 1959, ch. 196 §§4, 5(3), 1959 Wash. Laws 865-6 (repealed by
Laws 1st Ex. Sess. 1973, ch.142 §66).
40. Id. §5(3) at 866.
41. Id. §6 at 866.
42. WASH. REV. CODE §71.02.090 (1959), 1959 Wash. Laws 81-82 (repealed by Laws
1st Ex. Sess. 1973, ch. 142 §66).
43. Id. §71.02.110.
44. Id. §71.02.170 at 85..
45. Id. §71.02.190 at 85 (guardian, counsel), §71.02.140 at 84 (counsel).
46. Id. §71.02.210 at 86.
47. Id. §71.02.101 at 80. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §71.02.010 (West 1959) defines
"mentally ill person" as'" ... any person found to be suffering from psychosis or other
disease impairing his mental health, and the symptoms of such disease are of a suicidal,
homicidal, or incendiary nature which would render such person dangerous to his own
life or to the lives or property of others."
48. Id. §71.02.240 at 87.
49. Id. §71.02.650 at 93.
50. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §71.05 et seq. (West 1975). The background material
contained in Section II has been largely adapted from Durham & Pierce, Beyond Deinstitu-




of the state's commitment authority5' and imposed significant pro-
cedural safeguards on the process of commitment. 52
1. Commitment Criteria
In 1973 the law was revised to allow commitment of people who
"as a result of a mental disorder present[ed] a likelihood of serious
harm to others or [themselves] or [were] gravely disabled." 5 3 Be-
havior that threatened or attempted harm to the individual or to
others established "likelihood of serious harm."5 4 A person was
dangerous to herself if she had threatened or attempted self-in-
flicted physical harm or suicide. The "danger to others" criterion
was satisfied by behavior which "had caused harm or substantial
risk of harm in the past, or which placed others in reasonable fear of
sustaining harm." The statute was not specific regarding evidence
that would establish dangerousness or harm to others. 5 5
"Gravely disabled" was defined as a "condition in which a person,
as a result of a mental disorder, is in danger of serious physical harm
resulting from a failure to provide for his essential human needs." 56
The state was not to commit individuals involuntarily if they could
live independently or with the assistance Of family or friends.
This restrictive definition of "gravely disabled" often prevented
families from securing commitment of a family member they be-
lieved needed involuntary treatment. 57 Mental health authorities
objected to the restrictive criteria on the grounds that as long as the
family provided essential human needs, commonly understood as
food, clothing, and shelter, a non-dangerous patient had to enter
the mental health system voluntarily or not at all.
Under the statutory provisions governing voluntary admission to
state mental health facilities, a patient signed an application for ad-
mission which the county mental health professional and the direc-
51. See infra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
52. See infra notes 63-70 and accompanying text.
53. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §71.05.150(1)(a) (West 1975). Several commentators
praised the 1973 ITA as a model for civil commitment statutes. See, e.g., Treffert &
Krajeck, In Search of a Sane Commitment Statute, 6 PsYcniAmRic ANNALS 56 (1976).
54. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §71.05.020 (West 1975).
55. Another notable revision in the 1973 ITA was the removal of property destruc-
tion as behavior for which a person could be detained involuntarily. Several observers
have recently claimed that omission of the property destruction provision was the result
of oversight rather than a philosophically based decision. Personal communication with
Steven Hosch, Assistant Attorney General, State of Washington (January - March 1980).
56. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §71.05.020 (West 1975).
57. In 1971, the patient population at Washington state hospitals was approximately
2,485. By 1976, the patient population had dropped to 1,202, a decrease of 51.7 per-
cent. The decline in patient population leveled off by the mid 1970's and did not begin
to rise until the year prior to the enactment of ITA 1979.
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tor of the facility or his designate then had to approve. 58 A
voluntary patient would stay in the facility until she or the director
determined that treatment was no longer appropriate.5 9 In any
event, a voluntary patient would have her case reviewed by the med-
ical staff at least every 180 days. She could not continue as a patient
for more than a year without reapplying for admission.60 The pa-
tient also had the right to leave the facility at any time unless invol-
untary commitment proceedings were initiated. 6' The availability of
voluntary admission could be limited when the lack of adequate staff
or facilities dictated restricted access.6 2
2. Procedural Protections
Another major change in the 1973 statute was the addition of pro-
cedural protections to end indefinite commitment and to shorten
the length of hospital detentions. The 1973 ITA authorized one 72-
hour evaluation period 6 3 followed, when appropriate, by commit-
ments of 14 days64 and 90 days6 5 (not renewable), and 180 days 66
(renewable). The law provided for a probable cause hearing prior
to the non-renewable 14-day detention period. 6 7 Detention for
lengthier stays (90 and 180 days) required evidence that the patient
had attempted or had inflicted physical harm on another person
either as the reason for his custody or during the evaluation and
treatment period. 68 After the 14-day treatment period, the patient
could be confined for a period not exceeding 90 days only if he in
fact exhibited threatening behavior. A petition to a court and a sub-
sequent judicial hearing, with the right to a jury trial if requested,
were required to hold a patient for 90 days. 69 Successive 180-day
58. WASH REV. CODE ANN. §72.23.070 (West 1982).
59. WASH REV. CODE ANN. §72.23.070 (West 1982); WASH. ADMIN. CODE R. 275-55-
081 (1983).
60. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§72.23.070(2), 72.23.100 (West 1982); WASH. ADMIN.
CODE R. 275-55-081, 275-55-241(2)(b) (1983).
61. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §71.05.050 (West Supp. 1985).
62. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §72.23.110 (West 1982).
63. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §71.05.180 (West 1975).
64. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §71.05.230 (West 1975).
65. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §71.05.320 (West 1975).
66. Id.
67. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §71.05.240 (West 1975).
68. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§71.05.280, 71.05.320 (West 1975). In addition, if the
state seeks to confine the patient beyond the 14-day period authorized at the probable
cause hearing, a committee is entitled to a jury trial and a determination of whether the
state has established these facts. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §71.05.310 (West 1975). Re-
cently, the Supreme Court of Washington has held that the government must establish
such facts by clear, cogent and convincing evidence and that a less than unanimous jury
verdict on these issues satisfies constitutional due process requirements. Dunner v. Mc-
Laughlin, 100 Wash.2d 832, 843-845, 676 P.2d 444, 451-452 (1984).
69. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §71.05.290 (West 1975).
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commitments were permissible only when the court issued a valid
order authorizing them. A single order could never be authorized
for a period exceeding 180 days.70
The 1973 ITA was designed to establish a formal involuntary
commitment scheme underjudicial supervision characterized by sig-
nificant procedural protections. Prior to 1973, Washington, like
many other states, had used a model of commitment which placed
the primary authority to evaluate and commit a patient in the hands
of licensed practicing physicians who were required to recommend
to a probate court that a person was in need of inpatient care.7'
After enactment of the 1973 ITA, counties were required to appoint
County Designated Mental Health Professionals ("CDMHPs") who
investigated and evaluated all complaints of mental disorder which
might lead to confinement. The mental health professional had to
be a psychiatrist, clinical psychologist, psychiatric nurse, social
worker, or some other individual with special training or experience
in mental health.72 The institution of a system of county-based facil-
ities within a state-wide involuntary commitment network marked a
dramatic departure from the commitment procedure in effect prior
to 1973. Under the 1973 ITA, the mental health professional, after
investigating and evaluating the specific facts alleged, could at his
discretion summon an individual to appear at an appropriate facil-
ity for not more than a 72-hour evaluation and treatment period. 73
This commitment process, still largely in effect, functions as a
funnel whereby far fewer people are retained in the system than are
referred to it at each of the critical decision points-72 hours; 14,
90 and 180 days.74 Although anyone in the community can make
referrals to a CDMHP, the CDMHP evaluates the referral and de-
cides whether the client should be held for 72 hours. During this 72-
hour period, the patient is evaluated by medical personnel at the
Evaluation and Treatment (E&T) facility to determine whether de-
tention for an additional 14 days is warranted. If the patient does
not elect voluntary status and the CDMHP or E&T facility believes a
14-day commitment is appropriate, a probable cause hearing must
occur within 72 hours of the initial admission. A court commis-
sioner or superior court judge presides at this hearing; the patient is
represented by a private attorney or, if indigent, a court-appointed
70. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §71.05.320 (West 1975).
71. See supra notes 39-49 and accompanying text.
72. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §71.05.020(l1) (West 1975).
73. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §71.05.150(1)(a) (West 1975). This provision was re-
cently struck down as unconstitutional due to its failure to require prior judicial approval
of the summons. In Re Harris, 98 Wash. 2d 276, 287, 654 P.2d 109, 114 (1982).
74. See Figure 1.
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attorney or public defender.75
At any time during the 14-day commitment, professional staff at
the detention (E&T) facility or the CDMHP may file a petition for a
90-day commitment. 76 Since the E&T staff member, rather than the
CDMHP, is the person who is in daily contact with the patient, the
CDMHP is rarely involved in the filing of petitions beyond the 14-
day detention. A probable cause hearing or arraignment must be
held on the first working day after the petition is filed. 77 Within five
days of the probable cause hearing, a fact-finding hearing must be
held.78 Provisions for legal counsel are the same as for the 14-day
hearing,79 and at 90- and 180-day hearings the patient is entitled to
a jury, although a jury is rarely impaneled.8 0
3. Reaction to the 1973 Statute
Following enactment of the 1973 ITA, families and mental health
professionals expressed great dissatisfaction with the law.8 ' Criti-
cism of the nationwide trend toward narrow commitment criteria
came from people in many states where similar laws were being en-
acted.82 "Psychiatric ghettos" were reportedly developing in large
75. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §71.05.200(b) (West 1975).
76. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §71.05.290 (West 1975).
77. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §71.05.300 (West Supp. 1985).
78. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §71.05.310 (West Supp. 1985).
79. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §71.05.200(b) (West 1975); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§71.05.230(6) (West Supp. 1985); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.05.300 (West Supp.
1985).
80. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §71.05.300 (West Supp. 1985); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§71.05.320 (West Supp. 1985).
81. Throughout the United States, psychiatrists reported incidents in which they
were unable to secure "essential" treatment for clients. A number of these incidents are
summarized in the American Psychiatric Association brief in Project Release v. Prevost, 772
F.2d 960 (2d Cir. 1983). There is also significant evidence that deinstitutionalization
was beneficial to mentally ill patients previously confined in public mental health facili-
ties. See, e.g., J. RITTENHOUSE, WITHOUT HOSPITALIZATION: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF
PSYCHIATRIC CARE IN THE HOME (1970); Dittmar & Franklin, State Hospital Patients Dis-
charged to Nursing Homes: Are Hospitals Dumping Their More Difficult Patients?, 31 HosP. &
COMM. PSYCHIATRY 251 (1980) (but notes that the most difficult patients were not among
those discharged); Livermore, Malmquist & Meehl, supra note 10, at 757; Mosher, Menn,
Matthews, & Soteria, Evaluation of Home-Based Treatment for Schizophrenia, 45 AM. J. OR-
THOPSYCHIATRY 455 (1975); Polak & Kirby, A Model to Replace Psychiatric Hospitals, 162 J.
NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 13 (1976); Ennis & Litwack, supra note 7, at 717, citing Rap-
peport, Lassen & Grunewald, Evaluations and Follow-Up of State Hospital Patients Who Had
Sanity Hearings, 118 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1078 (1962); Shah, Some Interactions of Law and
Mental Health in the Handling of Social Deviance, 23 CATH. U.L. REV. 674, 695 (1974);
Steadman, Follow-Up on Baxtrom Patients Returned to Hospitals for the Criminally Insane, 130
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 317 (1972); Steadman & Keveles, The Community Adjustment and Crimi-
nal Activity of the Baxtrom Patients: 1966-1970, 129 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 304 (1972).
82. See supra note 18. See also Miller & Fiddleman, Involuntary Civil Commitment in





FIGURE 1-Involuntary Detention "Funnel,"
Washington State, 1977-81
REFERRALS TO CDMHPS (100%)
HELD FOR 72 hrs (32%
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cities where former mental patients lived in squalor and isolation.83
Psychiatrists claimed that restrictive civil commitment laws had the
effect of decreasing human dignity 4 and diverting the mentally ill
into jails and prisons. 85
In Washington, psychiatrists claimed that county mental health
professionals, most of whom were non-medically trained individu-
als, were not qualified to assess the appropriateness of the initial
commitment decision.8 6 Family members were often opposed to re-
strictive commitment criteria since such laws frequently prevented
them from securing a relative's commitment to a mental institu-
tion.87 "Patient advocate" support groups, such as Family Action
for the Seriously Emotionally Disturbed (F.A.S.E.D.) and Washing-
ton Advocates for the Mentally Ill (W/AMI) lobbied the legislature
to expand the commitment authority of the state.
Efforts to change the commitment law received significant impe-
83. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, May 21, 1978, §6 (Magazine), at 14; id., Nov. 18, 1979, at 1;
id., Nov. 19, 1979, at BI; id., Nov. 20, 1979, at BI.
84. Roth, A Commitment Law for Patients, Doctors, and Lawyers, 136 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY
1121 (1979); W. GAYLIN, CARING (1976).
85. See Abramson, The Criminalization of Mentally Disordered Behavior. Possible Side-Effect
of a New MentalHealth Law, 23 Hose. & COMM. PSYCHIATRY 101 (1972). Bonovitz & Guy,
Impact of Restrictive Civil Commitment Procedures on a Prison Psychiatric Service, 136 Am. J.
PSYCHIATRY 1045 (1979); A. URMER, A STUDY OF CALIFORNIA'S NEw MENTAL HEALTH
LAW (1971); A. URMER, THE BURDEN OF THE MENTALLY DISORDERED ON LAW ENFORCE-
MENT (1983); ROCHE REPORT, FRONTIERS OF PSYCHIATRY (1978); But see Bonovitz & Bo-
novitz, Diversion of the Mentally Ill Into the Criminal Justice System. The Police Intervention
Perspective, 138 AM.J. PSYCHIATRY 973 (1981).
86. See LEGISLATIVE BUDGET COMMITrEE OF WASHINGTON, JOINT STUDY OF THE WASH-
INGTON STATE INVOLUNTARY TREATMENT ACT, REPORT No. 83-7, at 16 (1983) [hereinafter
cited as "L.B.C."I.
87. Id at 16-17.
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tus from the 1978 murder of a wealthy Seattle couple by their 23-
year-old next door neighbor, Angus MacFarlane, who had been de-
nied voluntary admission to Western State Hospital only hours
before the murder. The publicity surrounding the homicide and the
trial portrayed Washington's mental health system as poorly fi-
nanced and inaccessible."8 The MacFarlane case did not directly in-
volve a violent crime committed by a mentally ill person whom the
state had tried and failed to commit involuntarily, but it did help
publicize the plight of families who had been unable to secure invol-
untary treatment for family members under the existing "grave disa-
bility" or "likelihood of serious harm" standards. This case, and the
public outcry that accompanied it, appear to have been instrumental
in persuading the Washington legislature to revise the 1973 ITA.
C. Involuntary Treatment Act of 1979
The Washington state legislature enacted changes in the Involun-
tary Treatment Act which went into effect on September 1, 1979.
The basic structure of the 1973 Involuntary Treatment Act re-
mained. Senate Bill 2415, which became the 1979 ITA, specifically
stated that its intent was to accomplish the purposes of and to reaf-
firm the 1973 Act.89 However, it is quite clear from the legislative
history of the 1979 ITA that the Washington State Legislature in-
tended to create a "wider net" for involuntary commitment. The
legislative history of the 1979 ITA indicates that lawmakers were
responding to public concern that the 1973 ITA commitment stan-
dards were too restrictive. By expanding the definition of "gravely
disabled," persons in need of treatment but who fell outside the
scope of the 1973 ITA criteria could be reached under the 1979
ITA.90 In creating "a much wider net," the state legislature realized
that the proposed budget might be inadequate to address the antici-
pated influx of new patients under the more expansive commitment
criteria.9 1
88. Gillie, Murder Suspect was Refused Entry at Western State, Tacoma News Tribune,
Aug. 10, 1978, at B-12, col. 1; Hahn, Suspect Wanted Treatment, Seattle Post-Intelligencer,
Aug. 10, 1978, at A-I, col. 1; Foster, Parents Claim Law Fails the 'Chronic' Patient, Seattle
Post-Intelligencer, Aug. 27, 1978, at F-i (Magazine), col. 1; Rothstein, Care Denied to
Mentally Ill, Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Sept. 28, 1978, at F-I (Magazine), col. 1; Hahn, A
Trail of Anguish, Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Nov. 4, 1978, at A-I, col. 1; Gillie, Group
Pushes Family Action, Tacoma News Tribune, Nov. 5, 1978, at F-i, col. 1.
89. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §71.05.015 (West Supp. 1985).
90. Wash. Legis. Report, 46th Leg., ist Ex. Sess. 153 (1979).
91. Senator McDermott, a legislator who had worked as a psychiatrist for the King
County Jail, acknowledged this problem openly "[n]ow we are putting quite an increase
into the mental health budget but I am not really sure that it will cover all the people who will




The fundamental change sought in 1979 was the expansion of
the substantive power of the state to commit persons involuntarily.
Consequently, the legislature revised the criteria for civil commit-
ment to accomplish this objective. The revised criteria 1) expanded
the definition of "gravely disabled," and 2) expanded the definition
of "likelihood of serious harm" to include destruction of property.
Though the statute also provided for minor changes regarding re-
commitment of patients who violated the terms of their conditional
release9 2and permitted spousal testimony in commitment hear-
ings,9 3 the 1979 ITA did not change any of the procedures gov-
erning involuntary commitment of individuals to mental health
facilities.
1. Expansion of the Definition of "Gravely Disabled"
As the 1979 law defined it, "[g]ravely disabled means a condition
in which a person, as a result of a mental disorder a) is in danger of
serious physical harm resulting from a failure to provide for his es-
sential human needs of health or safety, or b) manifests severe deterioration
in routine functioning evidenced by repeated and escalating loss of cognitive or
volitional control over his or her actions and is not receiving such care as is
essential for his or her health or safety." 94 This change in the definition
ation in 1980-1981." Wash. S.S.B. 2415, 46th Leg., 1979 SENATEJOURNAL (Reg. and 1st
Ex. Sess.) 1173 (Point of Inquiry, response of Sen. McDermott) (emphasis added).
92. The 1979 ITA authorized recommitment of a conditionally released patient
solely on the ground that the patient had violated a condition of his release. WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. §71.05.340(3) (West Supp. 1985). Under the 1973 ITA, the state had to
show a violation of conditional release and that the patient had engaged in conduct
indicating that he was dangerous to self or others.
93. The 1979 ITA permitted testimony of a spouse to be admitted in a commitment
proceeding. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §5.60.060 (West Supp. 1985). Judges in different
counties had different interpretations of whether the 1973 ITA permitted a spouse to
testify against another spouse in a commitment hearing.
94. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §71.05.020(1) (West Supp. 1984). Italics indicate added
language. This statutory revision has not yet been challenged as constitutionally defi-
cient. In Colyar v. Third Judicial District Court, 469 F. Supp. 424 (D. Utah 1979), the dis-
trict court struck down the Utah civil commitment statute under a substantive due
process analysis. It held that the state may not involuntarily commit a mentally ill per-
son who is in fact able to provide himself with the basic necessities of life such as food.
clothing and shelter, rejecting the state's contention that its parens patriae authority per-
mitted it to hospitalize coercively mentally ill individuals who were unable to seek or
accept treatment voluntarily even if such persons could provide for their basic physical
necessities. See La Fond, Purposes of Commitment, supra note 2, at 517-518.
Arguably, then, this section of the 1979 ITA is vulnerable to a successful constitu-
tional challenge since it permits involuntary commitment of mentally ill persons who can
provide for their basic physical necessities but are not receiving ". . care... essential
for. . .health." See also Stamus v. Leonhardt, 414 F. Supp. 439 (S.D. Iowa 1976)(Iowa
civil commitment statute held violative of the Fourteenth Amendment); Doremus v. Far-
rell, 407 F. Supp. 509 (D. Neb. 1975)(Nebraska civil commitment statute held violative
of Fourteenth Amendment); Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F.Supp. 378 (M.D. Ala. 1974)(Ala-
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of "gravely disabled" expanded the scope of the state's parens patriae
power; it authorized mental health professionals to commit invol-
untarily people who could not function independently in the com-
munity or who manifested severe deterioration in routine
functioning because of mental impairment.
The 1973 ITA had provided that involuntary commitment of a
non-dangerous mentally ill person was available only if she could
not minimally satisfy her basic "human needs."9 5 In 1979 the
phrase "human needs of health or safety" was added to expand the
scope of the commitment standard. Thus, families seeking to com-
mit a mentally ill member may now establish that her essential
health needs cannot be provided outside a hospital, even though the
family may be able to assure the individual's physical safety.
It had been observed that discharged patients were often able to
care for themselves in the community without great difficulty for
several months. However, after approximately 60 to 90 days, many
stopped taking their prescribed medication, and exhibited rapid de-
terioration in their ability to function independently. The expan-
sion of the definition of grave disability under the 1979 ITA allowed
evidence of such "decompensation" 9 6 as a basis for commitment,
where evidence of deterioration is thought to indicate a reasonable
probability that the person is, or will imminently become, gravely
disabled without treatment.
2. Inclusion of Property Damage
The 1979 amendments also redefined "likelihood of serious
harm" as follows:
a) a substantial risk that physical harm will be inflicted by an individual
upon his own person, as evidenced by threats or attempts to commit
suicide or inflict physical harm on one's self; b) a substantial risk that
bama involuntary and emergency commitment statute held violative of Fourteenth
Amendment); Bell v. Way,: County Gen. Hosp., 384 F.Supp. 1085 (E.D. Mich. 1974);
Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F.Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972) vacated and remanded for a more
specific order, 414 U.S. 473, order on remand, 379 F.Supp. 1376 (1974), vacated and remanded
on other grounds, 421 U.S. 957 (1975), order reinstated on remand, 413 F.Supp. 1318 (1976);
Dixon v. Attorney Gen., 325 F.Supp. 966 (M.D. Pa. 197 1)(Pennsylvania commitment
statute held violative of Fourteenth Amendment); Commonwealth ex rel. Finken v. Roop,
234 Pa. Super. 155, 339 A.2d 764, 776-79 (1975) (only three of seven judges agreed on
this point), appeal dismissed 424 U.S. 960 (1976). But see Suzuki v. Yuen, 617 F.2d 173
(9th Cir. 1980).
95. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
96. Decompensation is a progressive deterioration of routine functioning supported
by evidence of repeated and escalating loss of cognitive or volitional control of actions.
The definition is incorporated in the statute. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 71.05.020(l)(b) (West Supp. 1985). This term is used to diagnose the presence of
mental illness. See, e.g., DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 5




physical harm will be inflicted by an individual upon another, as evi-
denced by behavior which has caused such harm or which places an-
other person or persons in reasonable fear of sustaining such harm; or
,c) a substantial risk that physical harm will be inflicted by an individual upon the
property of others, as evidenced by behavior which has caused substantial loss or
.damage to the property of others.9 7
This type of police power authority was often sanctioned in early
mental health legislation and remains a part of the laws in several
states.9 8 The fact that property damage may include tampering with
any object that is of some value to another person confers wide dis-
cretion on mental health professionals in making commitment
decisions.99
D. The Mental Health System Responds to the Change
The broadened commitment criteria of the 1979 statute signifi-
cantly increased the likelihood that more patients would be commit-
ted to public mental health facilities in circumstances that would not
have justified commitment under the 1973 ITA. However, while the
revised statute made it easier to commit more people to state
mental facilities, expansion of mental health resources did not
match the expansion of authority to detain patients involuntarily. '00
Staffing and bed space did not expand apace to accommodate the
growing number of patients in the system.
Following passage of the 1979 ITA, it was immediately apparent
that increased admissions would result. In fact, an avalanche of in-
voluntary admissions practically overwhelmed the institutional re-
sources available in the state.' 0 ' In response to a 180 percent
97. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §71.05.020(3) (West Supp. 1984).
98. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16 §5001(1) (1983); HAWAIi REV. STAT. § 334-59 (Supp.
1983).
99. In Suzuki v. Yuen, 617 F.2d 173 (9th Cir. 1980), the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit struck down as unconstitutionally broad a Hawaii commit-
ment statute containing a commitment criterion almost identical to this provision of the
1979 ITA. Though no constitutional attack has yet been made on the Washington crite-
rion, it appears vulnerable to challenge. After the opinion in the Suzuki case, Washing-
ton commitment personnel were discouraged in state-sponsored training sessions from
committing individuals solely on this ground. Durham & Pierce, supra note 50.
100. In the 1977-79 Biennium, the ITA expenditures of state and federal funds
amounted to $9.7 million. These funds covered administrative costs such as investiga-
tion, direct court costs, transportation, and local hospital costs. In the 1979-81 Bien-
nium, these expenditures amounted to $15.7 million to cover the same costs, thereby
increasing by 61.8%. (These figures do not include that portion of the state hospital
budget devoted to support of the ITA program.) L.B.C., supra note 86, at 32-33.
101. In the two years before the implementation of the 1979 ITA, there were 1485
commitments (Sept. 1977- Aug. 1978) and 1889 commitments (Sept. 1978-Aug. 1979)
in King and Pierce counties. In the two years following the 1979 ITA, there were 2463
commitments (Sept. 1979-Aug. 1980) and 2449 commitments (Sept. 1980- Aug. 1981)
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increase in involuntary admissions, Western State Hospital
(WSH),I0 2 which serves all of western Washington, opened another
ward that filled up immediately. Faced with increasing pressure to
admit involuntary patients, and the attendant demand on staff and
resources, WSH instituted a "limited admissions" policy which re-
stricted admissions to 90 percent of bed capacity. This amounted to
an effective cap on admissions to the hospital.
Other psychiatric units in Pierce County, where WSH is located,
were filled to 100 percent capacity for months at a time.10 3 The
overflow of psychiatric patients was handled on an emergency,
makeshift basis. Patients stayed in medical units of local hospitals or
in nursing homes until beds could be found in evaluation and treat-
ment units. The Office of Involuntary Commitment in Pierce
County notified all community hospitals, social agencies, and
CDMHPs, apprising them of the situation and warning them that
referrals to the Pierce County E&T facility might not lead to deten-
tion because of the limited availability of bed space at WSH. Weary
of shopping around for openings in an evaluation and treatment fa-
cility, the Pierce County CDMHP obtained a temporary restraining
in those counties. This phenomenon of an increase in the number of involuntary pa-
tients, following revision of statutory commitment criteria to expand the state's commit-
ment authority, has occurred elsewhere. In 1979 North Carolina revised its
commitment law in such a manner and, on a sample basis, experienced a significant
increase in the number of patients committed. However, it is not clear whether North
Carolina's increase is attributable to the change in commitment criteria or to a change in
the conception of the attorney's role from that of an advocate for freedom to that of an
advocate for the best interest of the client. See Miller & Fiddleman, supra note 82. This
pronounced increase in the number of involuntary patients in Washington and North
Carolina contrasted sharply with the national experience prior to these statutory
changes.
Between 1971 and 1976, the number of state and county mental hospital residents in
the U.S. declined from 308,983 to 170,619. M.J. WITRIN, PROVISIONAL PATIENT MOVE-
MENT AND SELECTIVE ADMINISTRATIVE DATA, STATE AND COUNTY MENTAL HOSPITALS, IN-
PATIENT SERVICES BY STATE; UNITED STATES, 1976, Mental Health Statistical Note 153,
N.I.M.H. (1979).
102. Western State Hospital ("WSH") is located in Pierce County and is the major
mental health facility in the state. As of 1982, it had an acute care inpatient psychiatric
bed capacity of 52 beds specifically designated to serve involuntarily committed patients.
103. During August 1981, there were 24 persons admitted to WSH via temporary
restraining orders and 46 persons who had to wait in restraints in the Harborview Hos-
pital Emergency Room ("ER") for the first available bed. The average waiting time in
restraints was 7.7 hours per case. As local and state bed occupancy continued to exceed
capacity, more patients had to be restrained in the ER to wait for a bed, and temporary
restraining orders became a major mechanism for admitting patients to involuntary in-
patient care. HOSPITALIZATION UTILIZATION STUDY, Dec. 29, 1981, at 5. The 1981-83
expenditure rate for ITA patients in community hospitals exceeded projections by ap-
proximately $146,000 per month. The reasons stated were "inflation in costs of serv-
ices, particularly daily hospital bed rates and hospital utilization rates near 100%."




order forcing WSH to accept all persons detained under the 1979
ITA regardless of bed space. 10 4 Other counties joined Pierce
County and obtained a permanent injunction requiring WSH to ad-
mit involuntarily detained patients despite the unavailability of beds.
At the same time, state mental health officials instituted a policy
designed to decrease the length of stay for patients in community
facilities. The state would no longer reimburse providers in the pri-
vate sector for services rendered after the 14th day of commitment
unless the Division of Mental Health gave special approval, thus en-
suring that virtually all 90- and 180-day commitments would be at
state hospitals. 105 In instituting this policy, the state sought to lower
the cost of lengthier commitments since hospitalization at state hos-
pitals costs the state less than inpatient care in private facilities.' 0 6
The 1979 ITA brought extreme pressure on the mental health
system to provide services for a rapidly growing involuntary patient
population. The research reported here describes a variety of ef-
fects which resulted from the statutory change.
III. Research Methodology
A. Design
The change in Washington's civil commitment law presented an
opportunity to study the direct as well as the indirect (and unantici-
pated) effects of a legislative change in commitment criteria. Study
of the new law's impact called for a close examination of commit-
ments of a large number of clients two years prior to and two years
following the legal change. By examining a computerized file of all
patients committed to state mental hospitals and a large sample of
individual case records in two county offices of involuntary commit-
ment, the investigators were able to construct a longitudinal time
104. Pierce County v. Western State Hospital, 97 Wash. 2d 264, 644 P.2d 131
(1982). The Washington State Department of Social and Health Services ("DSHS") was
very concerned with conditions at Western State Hospital. In its brief for the Washing-
ton Supreme Court, DSHS described Western State Hospital as "dangerous, over-
crowded and not conducive to the providing of adequate care and treatment." Brief for
Appellant at 21, Pierce County v. Western State Hospital, 97 Wash.2d 264, 644 P.2d 131
(1982).
105. L.B.C., supra note 86, at 59, 60; WASH. ADMIN. CODE R. 275-55-367(4)(c)
(1983).
106. See CIVIL COMMITMENT IN KING COUNTY, FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMITrEE ON
KING COUNTY INVOLUNTARY CIVIL COMMITMENT, June 26, 1981, at 32. State Hospital
costs were estimated to be about $77 per patient per day (inclusive of medical charges),
while private community inpatient hospitalization cost from $175 - $245 per day (exclu-
sive of medical charges). Id. at 33.
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series which compared the pre-1979 with the post-1979 ITA
patterns.
B. Data for the Study
The study is based on two primary data sources. The first one
derives from Washington's Department of Social and Health Serv-
ices' 0 7 which maintains a computerized data base for all patients ad-
mitted to state mental hospitals; this includes information on each
patient's demographic characteristics, diagnoses, admission status
(voluntary or involuntary) and prior admission history. The second
group of data consists of individual case records of a randomly se-
lected group of 3,570 individuals who were referred to the Offices of
Involuntary Commitment in King and Pierce counties from Septem-
ber, 1977 through August, 1981. Review of individual case records
allowed a more detailed analysis of the commitment process than
was possible using only the state's computerized data base. The
3,570 individuals sampled accounted for 8,100 referrals to the civil
commitment system and 3,900 commitments. Clients who were ex-
amined by county designated mental health professionals but not
subsequently committed are included in the sample of 3,570 along
with those committed under applicable Washington law for 72
hours or longer.
C. Two County Analysis
1. Rationale for a Two County Analysis
Although the state's computerized file was obtained for each year
of the study period, it was also important to analyze the effect of the
statutory change on commitments occurring outside the state hos-
pital system. Study of client activity at the county level was useful
because admission to state mental hospitals is strongly influenced by
the availability of resources within a particular community. Commu-
nities that lack inpatient mental health resources will find some
other way to control the behavior of disturbed or disturbing people,
such as outpatient commitment or arrest for petty crimes.' 08
County offices of involuntary commitment make local arrangements
107. By statute, this department has the following responsibilities: "The depart-
ment of social and health services is designed to integrate and coordinate all those activ-
ites involving. . .care for individuals who. . .require financial assistance, institutional
care, rehabilitation or other social and health services. . .The department will concern
itself with changing social needs and will expedite the development and implementation
of programs designed to achieve its goals." WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §43.20A.010 (West
1983).




for most emergency and short-term commitments, and reserve
transfer to state mental hospitals for those patients requiring
lengthier stays. Increased demand for commitment at the county
level was investigated to determine its influence on demand at state
mental hospitals. The impact of the legal change on shorter deten-
tions which occurred solely at the local level was also measured.
Two of Washington's counties were analyzed in depth. King and
Pierce Counties were selected because approximately 40 percent of
Washington's involuntary commitments occur there, making it pos-
sible to collect a large number of client records within a short
timeframe. Pierce County was particularly important as a study site
because it is the location of the state's largest mental hospital, and
the influence of the hospital's presence on involuntary commitment
patterns could be studied.
Our data indicate that the variable "county" influences most as-
pects of the involuntary treatment system. Counties differ with re-
spect to administration, management, and available resources. The
influence of "county" was so strong that we performed many of our
analyses separately for each county to determine the varying influ-
ence of key factors on commitment and retention decisions.
2. King and Pierce Counties
The State of Washington is divided by the Cascade Mountain
Range. King and Pierce counties are located in the western half of
Washington and comprise the major urban center of the Pacific
Northwest. Just over 1.3 million people live in King County with the
greatest number (500,000) residing in Seattle. Pierce County is lo-
cated immediately south of King County and has 501,000 residents,
160,000 of whom live in Tacoma.
In the period studied, the counties differed significantly in
number and type of resources available to commitment authorities.
More resources per capita, in the form of dollars and CDMHPs,
were available in King County than in Pierce over the study period.
In 1981, ITA administrative funding' 0 9 was $1.42 per capita total
population for King County, compared with $1.31 for Pierce
County.11o In the same year, ITA administrative funding per ITA
detention was somewhat lower in King County ($924.00) than in
109. Administrative funds are those intended to cover the costs of ITA emergency
services, investigations, court processes, transportation and other minor administrative
expenses associated with county implementation of the ITA. This excludes the cost of
inpatient care at either the local or state hospital. L.B.C., supra note 86, at 47-48.
110. Id. at 47. This report states that there may be inaccuracies in the exactness of
these figures, but that they are accurate to illustrate county differences.
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Pierce ($977.71)."' l Over the period studied, four hospitals han-
dled the initial and short-term detentions in King County. Only four
months after the 1979 ITA went into effect, King County increased
its CDMHP staff from 11 to 27. This lowered the ratio of CDMHPs
per 100,000 population in King County, making it smaller than the
ratio for Pierce County.
Pierce County employed only 4 full-time and 5 part-time
CDMHPs over the study period and relied primarily upon one local
facility and the state hospital for emergency detentions. During that
time, lengthy detentions for both counties were referred to West-
ern State Hospital in Pierce County.
Assignment of legal counsel for indigent patients also varied be-
tween King and Pierce counties. In Washington State the most
common arrangements for assigning counsel involve a) relying on a
public defender, b) contracting with a local law firm, or c) assigning
an attorney on a rotation basis from a county-maintained list. Most
candidates for commitment in King County were represented by
public defenders during the study period. In Pierce County they
were represented by counsel appointed from a list approved by the
county commissioners. In sum, there were important differences
between King and Pierce counties in the availability of commitment
resources to mental health authorities and clients.
IV. Major Findings
The examination of state mental hospital data and individual case
records from the two counties yielded information on a variety of
aspects of Washington's mental health system. The findings dis-
cussed herein relate specifically to changes resulting from the state's
1979 revision of its involuntary commitment law.
A. "Anticipation Effect" and Reinstitutionalization of the Mentally Ill
Analysis of state mental hospital admissions and discharges
before and after the implementation of the 1979 ITA reveals that
involuntary admissions began to rise nine months before the effective
date of the new statute (see Table 1). Moreover, an even greater
increase in the number of commitments to state hospitals occurred
throughout Washington in the four months after the 1979 ITA
went into effect. Involuntary admissions to state hospitals during the
first four month period after the effective date of the 1979 ITA in-






Admission to State Mental Institution in Washington by Authority




% of % of
Year Month Number Total Number Total Total**
1977 9-12 325 33.9 634 66.1 959
1978 1-4 333 35.2 613 64.8 946
5-8 404 41.8 563 58.2 967
9-12 396 40.5 581 59.5 977
1979 1-4 486 45.3 586 54.7 1,072
5-8 591 53.3 518 46.7 1,109
*9-12 858 66.0 442 34.0 1,300
1980 1-4 872 66.4 441 33.6 1,313
5-8 1,129 74.7 382 25.3 1,511
I TA79 in effect as of September 1, 1979
•* Total admissions exclude state mental hospital patients on legal offender status.
sions for the same period showed a 14.7 percent decline (from 518
to 442), a decrease which did not offset the overall growth of invol-
untary commitments. The result for total hospital admissions was a
net increase of 17.2 percent, from 1,109 to 1,300, for this four-
month period (see Table 1).' 12 During the first full year under the
more inclusive commitment statute, the absolute number of invol-
untary admissions to state hospitals increased by 91 percent, from
591 to 1129. Over that same period, voluntary admissions fell from
46.7 percent of total admissions to 25.3 percent with the absolute
numbers declining 26.3 percent, from 518 to 382 (see Table 1).11 3
These trends suggest two important conclusions. First, there was
an "anticipation effect" indicated by an abrupt increase in involun-
tary admissions during the year before the effective date of the new
law. Empirical evidence from the two counties indicates that the in-
crease occurred both at Western State Hospital and at the local
112. There was a statistically significant difference in the growth of involuntary com-
mitments and the decline in voluntary admissions between the four months prior to the
legal change and the four months following (X2=39.8, df= 1, p<.001).
113. There was a statistically significant difference in the growth of involuntary com-
mitments and the decline in voluntary admissions between the four months prior to the
legal change and the end of the observation period (August 31, 1980) (X2= 129.3,
df= 1, p< .001). See Pierce, Durham & Fisher, The Impact of Broadened Civil Commitment
Standards on Admissions to State Mental Hospitals, 142 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 104 (1985) (sub-
stantial statistical analysis). Differences in percentages are due to the removal of legal
offender admissions in the discussion herein. This aspect of our research and its find-
ings have been published elsewhere.
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level. It has been argued elsewhere 1 4 that the increase in involun-
tary commitments at WSH was influenced by the MacFarlane mur-
der of August 1978 mentioned above. Immediately following that
well-publicized event, involuntary monthly admissions to the state
hospital increased from King County where the the murder oc-
curred, but not from elsewhere in the state. The MacFarlane mur-
der seemed to have a much less dramatic effect on commitments to
county facilities than on commitments to WSH. In the six months
following the murder, commitments in King County increased by
only 11.7 percent, while in Pierce County there was a slight drop in
the number of persons committed. In contrast, both King and
Pierce Counties experienced a substantial increase in the volume of
commitments (29.3 percent and 21.3 percent, respectively) in the
six months prior to the effective date of the 1979 ITA. l" 5 These
data suggest that there was an independent local effect of the Mac-
Farlane event on admissions from King County (both to the state
hospital and, to a lesser degree, in local facilities), and a general
anticipation effect in both counties attributable to the law in the six
months prior to the statutory change.
Interestingly, throughout the entire period of this study, the de-
mand for involuntary services (i.e., the number of referrals brought
to the attention of the CDMHP) increased only slightly. Yet in spite
of the small increase in the number of clients referred to CDMHPs
for initial evaluation, commitment rates increased significantly dur-
ing the year prior to and immediately following the effective date of the
1979 ITA.
The second important conclusion highlighted by the data on ad-
missions is that the sharp increase in involuntary commitments and
the concomitant disappearance of voluntary patients from state hos-
pitals cannot be attributed to an acceleration of a "revolving door"
pattern of rapid admission, discharge and readmission. Patients
were involuntarily committed regardless of their previous commit-
ment status. Table 2 establishes that, in the year following the en-
actment of the 1979 ITA, the probability of an involuntary
114. See Pierce, Durham, & Fisher, The Impact of Public Policy and Publicity on Admissions
to State Mental Health Hospitals, - J. HEALTH POLITICS, POLICY & LAw - (1985).
115. In King County, the random sample identified 486 commitments in the six
month interval from April, 1978 to August, 1978. In the six months following the mur-
der (Aug. 1978- Mar. 1979), 543 commitments were identified in the sample (11.7%
increase), followed by 702 commitments (29.3% increase) in the six months prior to the
statutory change. In Pierce County, the number of commitments in the sample dropped
from 354 (six months prior to the MacFarlane murder) to 291 (six months following) but





Probability of Involuntary Admission by Prior Admissions Status
and Authority, September 1, 1977 through August 31, 1980
PERCENT CURRENT ADMISSIONS INVOLUNTARY
Total
Current No Prior Prior Prior Involuntary
Admission Admission Voluntary Involuntary Admissions
Year Month % (N) % (N) % (N) % (N)
1977 9-12 28.6 (153) 17.9 ( 72) 43.4 ( 35) 25.5 ( 325)
1978 1-4 32.9 (171) 17.9 ( 74) 39.3 ( 77) 26.6 ( 333)
5-8 36.9 (195) 19.9 ( 77) 52.0 (116) 31.2 ( 404)
9-12 35.1 (184) 18.5 ( 70) 53.5 (123) 31.6 ( 396)
1979 1-4 40.7 (227) 21.9 ( 86) 59.0 (151) 36.2 ( 486)
5-8 47.3 (278) 25.1 ( 97) 65.8 (187) 42.4 ( 591)
$9-12 58.3 (380) 36.0 (134) 72.4 (302) 54.3 ( 858)
1980 1-4 54.8 (359) 41.6 (150) 74.3 (330) 55.2 ( 872)
5-8 63.2 (489) 41.7 (139) 79.7 (458) 62.1 (1129)
* ITA79 in effect as September 1, 1979
* Percentages will not sum to 100 percent because counts of cases are duplicated
where more than one prior admission status was involved.
admission to Washington state mental hospitals increased both for
first time admissions (from 47.3 to 63.2) and for patients previously
admitted on a voluntary basis (from 25.1 to 41.7).116 Thus, some of
the increase in involuntary commitment following enactment of the
1979 ITA is attributable both to patients entering the system for the
first time and to patients previously admitted voluntarily being com-
mitted involuntarily.
B. Changes in Use of Commitment Authority
1. Shift Toward Grave Disability
In conjunction with the growth in the number of involuntary com-
mitments following the 1979 ITA, Washington experienced a shift
toward a parens patriae-dominated civil commitment system. While
grave disability was the primary justification for commitment au-
thority even before implementation of the 1979 ITA, the use of
grave disability began to increase dramatically after the statute was
promulgated. By 1981 three of every four commitments relied on
the grave disability standard. The use of dangerousness to others
and dangerousness to self as a basis for commitment decreased, in-
116. See Table 2. There was a statistically significant increase in the proportion of
first time admissions (X2 = 33.7, df= 1, p <.001) and the proportion of patients previ-
ously admitted voluntarily (X2=21.6, df= 1. p<.001). See Pierce, Durham & Fisher,
supra note 113.
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volving only 29.7 percent and 25.7 percent of commitments respec-
tively. Moreover, the data indicate that clients committed for grave
disability were more likely to be ordered to 90- or 180-day confine-
ments than clients detained for dangerousness; the latter were usu-
ally released after 72 hours or 14 days.
This markedly increased reliance on the grave disability, as op-
posed to the dangerousness, ground for commitment occurred de-
spite the fact that the 1979 ITA expressly provided for commitment
of persons dangerous to property." 7 Thus, although the 1979 ITA
provided an expansion of both police power and parens patriae power,
the system relied almost exclusively on the increased parens patriae
authority, virtually ignoring the expanded police power authority
(see Table 3).
TABLE 3
Number (& %) of Commitments for New and Old Clients by





























































476 (33.5) 680 (37.7) 897 (37.7) 1003 (42.7)
1419 (100.0) 1805 (100.0) 2379 (100.0) 2348 (100.0)
Counts of cases are duplicated where more than one authority was cited as a basis for
commitment. Percentages will therefore not sum to 100%.
2. Changes in Clientele
This shift toward the use of the grave disability ground raises two
questions: First, is the growth in the committed population in




Washington due to an influx of new clients or to an increase in re-
commitments of old clients? Second, is the new emphasis of the
mental health system on parens patriae commitments due to increased
admissions of new clients as gravely disabled rather than dangerous,
or to a redefinition of old dangerous clients into a gravely disabled
category?
a. New Clients and Old Clients
The growth in commitments that occurred in the years before and
after the statutory change may be attributed to an increase in the
number of both new" l8 and old clients. 19 Although the absolute
number of newly committed clients exceeded the absolute number
of recommitments in each study year, the ratio of new to old clients
narrowed considerably as time went on (see Table 3). By 1981 the
number of new client admissions decreased (from 1482 to 1345),
while the number of readmissions increased (from 897 to 1003).120
The evidence indicates that, while the CDMHPs continued to detain
large numbers of new clients, former involuntary patients began to
return with increased frequency. This trend suggests a certain
"snowball" effect characterized by the later readmission of those
new clients committed during 1978 and 1979. Thus, continuing re-
lationships with the involuntary commitment system seem to have
been set in motion by the 1979 ITA, creating a pattern of recurring
institutional placement which appears difficult to break.' 21
Growth in the number of clients re-entering the commitment sys-
tem has consequently increased the likelihood of growth in the
number of those classified as "chronically mentally ill". Over the
four years of the study, 26.8 percent of all those committed were
classifiable as chronic patients under Washington's definition.i 22
Though constituting only a quarter of those committed, chronic pa-
tients were admitted more frequently, accounting for over half (53.2
118. A "new" client is defined as an individual who has not been previously commit-
ted in Washington State.
119. An "old" client is an individual with a prior commitment history in Washington
State, whether voluntary or involuntary.
120. There was a statistically significant drop in the number of new client admissions
between the year following the legal change and the end of the observation period (Au-
gust 31, 1981) (X2= 12.1, df=1, p<.001).
121. For a more thorough analysis of the implications of these data, see infra notes
134-136 and accompanying text.
122. Washington's Community Mental Health Service Act [codified at WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. §71.24.025(4)(a),(b) (West 1985)] defines as "chronically mentally ill" an
individual who has undergone two or more episodes of hospital care for a mental disor-
der within the preceding two years, or has experienced a continuous psychiatric hospi-
talization or residential treatment exceeding six month's duration within the preceding
year.
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percent) of the total of those committed during the four-year study
period and averaging 5.5 referrals and 3.2 commitments per indi-
vidual. Although there was no significant increase in the number of
chronic patients in the year immediately following the statutory
change, the number of chronic patients did increase gradually over
the study period. Thus, the stage may now be set for "old" clients to
become chronic patients in the future.
Table 3 indicates that in each year of the study, grave disability
was the statutory ground used most frequently to commit both new
and old clients. However, the use of grave disability increased by a
greater proportion for old than for new clients. During the final year
of the study, 80 percent of the increase in commitments for grave
disability was due to the recommitment of former clients. This indi-
cates that while a sizeable part of the increase in the number of com-
mitments for grave disability was attributable to new clients, more
and more of the gravely disabled population had a prior history of
commitment. 123
b. Redefinition of Old Clients: the Use of Police Power Authority
Together with the increased use of grave disability as a commit-
ment ground, the data reflect a tendency to replace the use of dan-
gerousness (i.e., police power authority) with the use of grave
disability (i.e., parens patriae authority). This trend was ascertained
by examining a) changes in the pattern of authority used to commit
a single patient over time, and b) changes in the type of commit-
ment authority used in situations involving violent behavior (the
type of behavior most likely to invoke police power authority).
(1) Reclassification. The commitment history of a group of 747
formerly committed patients revealed that more than one third
(34.6%) had been committed as dangerous to others or themselves
in years prior to the effective date of the 1979 ITA but were after-
wards committed as gravely disabled. To explore further this in-
crease in the number of commitments for grave disability, we
examined the distribution of commitments between the two sub-
types of grave disability, "health and safety"' 2 4 and "cognitive and
volitional impairment." 2 5
The data indicate that the number of commitments for health and
123. We found that the use of a grave disability finding to recommit returning clients
increased throughout the study period. By 1981, 80 percent of the increase in commit-
ments for grave disability was due to recommitment of clients who then fit Washington's
definition of "chronically mentally ill."





safety reasons increased gradually between 1977 and 1981. If any
peak occurred in the volume of such commitments, it was in the six
months prior to the 1979 ITA. This increase may be attributed to
the dramatic decline in the use of "gravely disabled-unspecified".
CDMHPs appear to have abandoned the use of "unspecified" as a
ground for commitment, in favor of "gravely disabled for cognitive
and volitional impairment reasons."' 2 6 While there was an actual
increase in the use of cognitive and volitional authority by CDMHPs
following the 1979 ITA, some of the change was due to the increase
in the use of multiple grounds for commitment. CDMHPs often
cited grave disability along with dangerousness as the reason for in-
voluntary detention.
(2) Violent behavior. Figure 2 summarizes the types of behavior
most often associated with different commitment grounds. "Bi-
zarre" behavior is mentioned with great frequency in all categories
of authority. Such behavior is troublesome and annoying to the
community (e.g., disruptive or disturbing behavior which may be
harmful to others), and is most often mentioned in conjunction with
other types of behavior. 12 7 "Health and safety" and "unspecified"
categories of grave disability show many similarities; both suggest,
for instance, a degree of "passive neglect" on the part of the client.
Cognitive and volitional impairment has some elements of passive
neglect but also appears to imply more active, threatening behavior.
"Dangerousness to self' is most often characterized by an affirma-
tive act of self-destruction (e.g., suicidal behavior or drug or alcohol
abuse). Table 4 presents evidence that people who engage in vio-
lent behavior may be committed as "dangerous to others" and/or as
gravely disabled. Trends from 1977 to 1981 indicate that there was
a shift in the primary statutory authority used to detain individuals
who engage in violent behavior. In 1977, danger to others was used
as the commitment authority in 79.4 percent of cases where the cli-
ent engaged in violent behavior, compared to 32.5 percent of cases
where grave disability was used. By 1981, grave disability was used
more often to detain clients who behaved violently (65.1%) than
dangerousness to others (60.7%) (see Table 4).128
126. In our sample, the number of gravely disabled-cognitive and volitional doubled
in the year after implementation of the 1979 ITA. The number of gravely disabled-
unspecified fell by 35 percent.
127. "Bizarre" behavior is based on behaviors cited in the mental health record,
including active hallucinations, delusions, paranoia, obsessions, incoherent speech, and
poor impulse control not stated as harmful or hazardous but as disruptive or disturbing
to others. See TEKNEKRON, INC., IMPROVING CALIFORNIA'S MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM: POL-
ICY MAKING AND MANAGEMENT IN THE INVISIBLE SYSTEM (Report for California Assembly
Permanent Subcommittee on Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities) (1978).
128. For individuals who engaged in violent behavior, there was a statistically signifi-
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FIGURE 2 - Types of Behavior Associated with Commitment
Authority, 1977-81*
CHARACTERISTIC
TYPE OF AUTHORITY BEHAVIORt
GRAVELY DISABLED: Bizarre (61.3)**, health & safety (52.2), cog. &
volitional (53.8)
GRAVELY DISABLED: Bizarre (67.0), violent behavior (36.3), health &
COGNITIVE & VOLITIONAL safety (43.4), cog. and volitional (50.8),
emotionally upset in active way (agitated, verbal
abuse) (32.5)
GRAVELY DISABLED: Bizarre (60.9), viol. behavior (45.6), cog. and
"UNSPECIFIED" volitional (44.9)
DANGEROUS TO OTHERS Bizarre (62.0), violent behavior (68.3), violent
threat (42.3), cog. & volitional (33.0)
DANGEROUS TO SELF Emotionally upset- passive (46.8), suicide ideas
(37.3), suicide attempts (33.2), bizarre (36.1).
t Bizarre Behavior - active hallucination, delusions, paranoia, obsessions, incoherent
speech, poor impulse control not stated as harmful or hazardous but disruptive or
disturbing to others (Teknekron, 1978).
Health and Safety - neglecting self; not eating; losing weight; no money; wandering;
"non-responsible" of self, environment, children; incontinent, not washing, can't
sleep.
Cognitive and Volitional - confused; disoriented; dazed; memory loss;
"decompensation" mentioned in file.
Violent Behavior - explicit act of violence to others which did or could have done
harm.
Violent Threat - threat of violence to others (verbal threats, gestures, harassment).
Emotionally Upset -
a. active - agitated, running away, verbal abuse.
b. Passive - depressed, despondent, not speaking, "nervous breakdown,"
"emotional upheaval," withdrawn, catatonic, crying, shaking,
regression.
Suicidal Ideation - suicidal ideas mentioned as reason for referral.
Suicide Attempt - unsuccessful, explicit suicide attempt by an active means.
** Reasons for detention are recorded by the CDMHP in the mental health record.
Since numerous behaviors (reasons) may have been recorded for a single client,
these percentages exceed 100%.
* See also Durham & Carr, Police Involvement in Involuntary Commitment, 35 Hose. &
COMM. PSYCHIATRY 580 (1984).
In sum, the observation that the parens patriae approach dominates
the present commitment system in Washington state is supported
by: 1) a continuing trend toward substituting police power commit-
ments with commitments under parens patriae authority; and 2) in-
creased use of the gravely disabled designation for new patients. In
particular, there has been a definite shift in the reliance by CDMHPs
cant change in the proportion of commitments for grave disability as compared with
danger to others between 1977 and 1981 (X2= 11.1, df= 1, p<.001).
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away from "dangerousness to self or others" toward "grave disabil-
ity" to commit those engaged in violent behavior.
TABLE 4
Comparison of Authority Used to Commit
Violent Behavior Over Time,
1977-1981
Violent
Gravely Danger to Behavior
Disabled Others Commitment
Year Month Number (%)* Number (%)* TOTALS
77-78 Sep-Feb 79 (32.5) 193 (79.4) 243
78 Mar-Aug 124 (40.1) 231 (74.8) 309
78-79 Sep-Feb 108 (34.5) 233 (74.4) 313
79 Mar-Aug 167 (41.5) 309 (76.8) 402
79-80 Sep-Feb 201 (50.0) 300 (74.6) 402
80 Mar-Aug 278 (58.5) 307 (64.6) 475
80-81 Sep-Feb 272 (72.1) 256 (67.9) 377
81 Mar-Aug 270 (65.1) 252 (60.7) 415
* Counts of cases are duplicated where more than one authority was cited
as a basis for commitment. Percentages will therefore not sum to
100%.
3. Litigation Outcomes
It is apparent from the data that King and Pierce Counties exhib-
ited very different detention rates at each step in the commitment
process. Beginning with the initial detention for 72 hours, King
County committed a significantly greater proportion of referees
(those referred for commitment to CDMHPs) than did Pierce
County129-one of every three individuals committed in King ver-
sus one of every four in Pierce.
Since client detention beyond 72 hours requires a judicial hear-
ing, litigation outcomes were examined to estimate any county vari-
ations (see Table 5). "Litigation outcomes" refers to the decision to
release, detain, or order a less restrictive alternative (LRA)1 30 once a
129. The sample represents 2,007 commitments in King, and 1,786 in Pierce County
(X2=77.1, df=1, p<.001).
130. A "less restrictive alternative" is a treatment environment which curtails indi-
vidual freedom only to the extent necessary to secure a legitimate community interest.
Its objective is to maintain the greatest degree of freedom, self-determination, auton-
omy, dignity and integrity while the patient is undergoing treatment for mental illness.
See Chambers, Community-Based Treatment and the Constitution: the Principle of the Least Re-
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petition for hearing has been filed. Dramatic variations were ob-
served in the litigation outcomes between the two counties studied.
As noted in Table 5, in Pierce County the state won virtually all 14-
and 90- day hearings, while in King County public defenders won
on behalf of detainees in as many as 13 percent of the cases. The
likelihood of commitment varied according to 1) the length of the
proposed detention and 2) the type of authority under which the
client was detained (see Table 5).
In both counties detention was more likely to occur at the hearing
for a 14-day commitment than at the hearings for a subsequent 90-
day commitment. This was due, in part, to the greater number of
LRAs which were ordered in lieu of 90-day inpatient stays. The 90-
day detention rate in King (43.3%) was less than half that of Pierce
(91.2%), as a consequence in part of the extensive use of LRAs in
King County (see Table 5).131 However, the pattern ofno release in
Pierce County was consistent across all types of commitment
authority.
Patients committed under certain types of commitment authority
had varying likelihoods of release. For example, at the 14-day hear-
ing a client alleged to be "dangerous to property" was twice as likely
to be released as one detained for "cognitive and volitional impair-
ment." Data from Table 5 indicate that rather than releasing cogni-
tively and volitionally impaired clients, the courts were likely to
order a LRA-especially if the hearing was for a lengthier commit-
ment. "Dangerousness to self' exhibited the same pattern; outright
release was unusual but LRAs were quite common in King County
at 14 days (22.1 percent) and at 90 days (42.0 percent). Clients who
were judged as dangerous to others had high detention rates at 14-
day hearings (95 percent in Pierce and 75 percent in King) but were
often given LRAs at 90-day hearings in King County (see Table 5).
While Pierce County had a much lower detention rate at 72
hours,' 32 mental health officials there rarely lost a hearing for 14-
or 90-day petitions (see Table 5).
Data from this study cannot be interpreted as conclusive evidence
that the high release rate for longer stays in King County was due
solely to the method of assigning legal counsel. Any explanatory
strictive Alternative in ALTERNATIVES TO MENTAL HOSPITAL TREATMENT 23-39 (1975); PRES-
IDENT'S COMMISSION ON MENTAL HEALTH: REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT FROM THE
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON MENTAL HEALTH (1978).
131. There was a statistically significant difference in the proportion of 90 day deten-
tions (excluding LRAs) in King County versus Pierce County (X2 = 50, df= I, p< .001).
132. Thus, CDMHPs in Pierce County are less likely to hold a patient referred to
them for initial evaluation for 72 hours in an evaluation and treatment center when com-
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effort must include factors such as the limited capacity for lengthier
inpatient detentions in King County (Pierce County has Western
State Hospital close at hand) or Pierce County's more effective
prescreening of mental health clients prior to 14- or 90-day
hearings.133
C. Conclusions
In sum, the 1979 ITA drastically increased the number of patients
confined in the state's public mental health facilities. All involun-
tary patients were more likely to be admitted as gravely disabled fol-
lowing enactment of the 1979 ITA. Gravely disabled patients
stayed the longest in the public psychiatric facilities and became re-
petitive users of the system. Simultaneously, patients seeking treat-
ment on a voluntary basis were virtually unable to obtain inpatient
treatment. Also, these data indicate that some patients previously
admitted as voluntary returned as involuntary patients.
The state's psychiatric facilities became so crowded that the major
public mental health facility in the state refused to accept all patients
referred to it for involuntary care and treatment. The highest court
in the state, however, ordered the hospital to take all patients so
referred regardless of the bed-space and treatment resources
available.
In addition, the sudden influx of involuntary patients into the
public mental health system preceded the effective date of the 1979
ITA. Moreover, contested commitment cases in two adjacent coun-
ties which use different systems for providing legal representation
reflected a wide disparity in outcomes.
V. Implications for Policy-makers
A. Effective Health Care in the Involuntary Civil Commitment System
1. Increase in Number of Patients Committed as Gravely Disabled
Some of the increase in the number of persons committed under
133. Since data on litigation outcomes are available for only two counties in Wash-
ington State, one with public defender and the other with assignment of private counsel,
it is impossible to complete an analysis which would identify the most decisive factor in
determining litigation outcomes. Future research should be conducted which include a
larger number of counties under a variety of methods of assigning legal counsel. In
other words, future analyses should ascertain whether other counties with public de-
fenders have outcomes similar to those in King County despite their dissimilarities to
King County in regard to other characteristics (urban/rural, large/small, small volume
of commitment activity/large volume of commitment activity). For a more thorough
discussion of the role of alternative factors influencing litigation outcomes, see infra notes




the 1979 ITA may be accounted for by involuntary commitment of
formerly voluntary patients. However, most involuntary patients
were new entrants into the state's mental health system. Thus, the
enactment of liberalized commitment criteria extended the net of
civil commitment to reach a new group of mentally ill individuals
who had not previously been users, either voluntary or involuntary,
of the state's institutional mental health svstem. 134
Some generalizations may be made regarding these new patients,
most of whom were committed as gravely disabled. Many were
judged as suffering from cognitive or volitional impairment (see Fig-
ure 2) and appear to have been committed on the basis of behavior
described by mental health professionals as "bizarre."'135 Prior to
the revision of the statutory commitment criteria, a significant
number of these individuals may not have been subjected to social
control through the mental health system.' 36
As mentioned above, mental health professionals used "grave dis-
ability" as a ground to commit persons who had previously been
committed solely as dangerous to self or others.' 37 This phenome-
non strongly suggests the increased use of multiple commitment
grounds to insure the "clutchability"' 38 of those persons for whom
involuntary commitment was sought. The 1979 ITA required proof
of explicitly dangerous behavior in order to commit a person as
dangerous to self or others.13 9 In contrast, commitment for grave
disability/cognitive or volitional impairment, is more subjective and
hence elastic since it is phrased in diagnostic terms.' 40 Moreover, it
does not require proof of specific types of behavior. Consequently,
this criterion may encourage excessive judicial deference to the
opinions of mental health professionals, thereby effectively insulat-
134. Some of these involuntary patients had been voluntary patients prior to enact-
ment of the 1979 statute. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
135. See supra Section IV B.2.b.(2) and Figure 2.
136. See supra notes 119-122 and accompanying text.
137. See supra notes 123-126 and accompanying text.
138. "Clutchability" refers to establishing the right of the state to hold a mentally ill
person coercively and without his consent. Joel Feinberg popularized the term in his
essay "Crime, Clutchability, and Individuated Treatment." SeeJ. FEINBERG, DOING AND
DESERVING 252-271 (1970). There is some empirical evidence suggesting that psychiat-
ric and judicial personnel will simply interpret even restrictive commitment criteria in
whatever way they deem necessary to insure that mentally ill persons whom they wish to
commit are involuntarily retained in the public mental health system. See Warren, Invol-
untayy Commitment for Mental Disorder: The Application of California's Lanterman-Petris-Short
Act, II LAw & Soc'Y 629, 633, 646 (1977); Comment,Involuntary Hospitalization, supra
note 27.
139. See supra notes 89-93 and accompanying text. The 1979 ITA did not revise the
definition of "dangerousness" provided in the 1973 ITA.
140. See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
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ing their commitment recommendations from judicial review.' 4 1
This is especially significant when considered in conjunction with
recent empirical evidence which casts doubt on the claimed exper-
tise of mental health professionals to predict dangerousness with
any degree of accuracy.' 42 In addition, inappropriate judicial defer-
ence to professionals' commitment recommendations based on
"grave disability" may also be encouraged, since there is empirical
evidence indicating that expert witnesses seldom testify on behalf of
patients at commitment hearings.143
The data also indicate that persons committed as gravely dis-
abled/cognitive or volitional impairment, are likely to remain in the
involuntary commitment system for a longer period of time than are
those committed under alternative statutory grounds. 144 There is
also evidence that this group has the greatest number of "chroni-
cally mentally ill" patients. 145 Though there are no firm conclusions
that can be drawn from these findings, they are nonetheless
troubling.
The immediate question raised is whether the forced hospitaliza-
tion of these patients has resulted in obtaining treatment of the disa-
bility for which the person was coercively commited. Although the
"right to treatment" has had an erratic history in the courts, 146 there
appears to be a consensus that, when the state deprives a person of
his liberty for purposes of treatment, it is constitutionally required
to provide treatment. Also, there is the distinct possibility that in
reaching out for a new patient population, 47 the state mental health
system has selected precisely the patients for whom it can do the
least good and for whom institutional treatment will consume the
most resources. 148
The findings provide evidence of the debilitating effect of institu-
141. See infra notes 176-177 and accompanying text.
142. See, e.g., Morse, supra note 8; La Fond, Purposes of Commitment, supra note 2; Ennis
& Litwack, supra note 7. But see Haddad, Predicting the Supreme Court's Response to the Criti-
cism of Psychiatric Predictions of Dangerousness in Civil Commitment Proceedings, 64 NEB. L. REV.
215 (1985).
143. See, e.g., Comment, Involuntary Hospitalization, supra note 27, at 1337.
144. See supra Section IV.B.1.
145. See supra note 122.
146. See infra note 165.
147. See supra notes 118-119 and accompanying text.
148. Actual expenditures by DSHS for implementation of the 1979 ITA increased
from $6.2 million in fiscal year 1980 to $14.6 million (estimated) in fiscal year 1983.
Measured biennially, DSHS expenditures for ITA implementation increased from $9.7
million in 1977-79 to $15.7 million in 1979-81 (61.8 percent); expenditures rose to
$26.4 million in 1981-83 (68.2 percent increase over previous biennium). For 1983-85,





tionalization.' 49 There is a significant body of literature asserting
that prolonged confinement in an institution where virtually all im-
portant decisions are made for an individual by others creates a de-
pendency on the institutional environment which diminishes her
ability to function on her own.' 50  It is instructive to note that most
of the individuals confined under the 1979 ITA as gravely dis-
abled/cognitive and volitionally impaired had not been committed
to state facilities under the 1973 ITA. Although there is no direct
evidence on the point, it seems reasonable to conclude that, prior
to their commitment, these individuals were coping adequately in
the community at least to the extent of organizing a daily routine
.and providing for their shelter, food, and clothing needs. At a mini-
mum, society generally expects that coercive treatment in a psychi-
,atric hospital should enhance a person's ability to return to the
community and live a more normal life. In contrast, the data from
,our study suggest that involuntary commitment may, at least for
some patients, actually result in successive hospitalization rather
-than in independent living in the community.
Many experts in the field of public mental health argue that, for
most mentally ill individuals, placement in the community with ade-
quate care provides more effective treatment than institutionaliza-
tion.15 1  The findings of this study lend support to this
hypothesis.' 52 It may be a wiser expenditure of limited public funds
to provide services in the community such as food and shelter for
the mentally ill, thereby enhancing their ability to function as self-
directing human beings, rather than sweeping them into over-
crowded mental hospitals to which they are likely to return with
alarming frequency.
2. Exclusion of Voluntary Patients From the Mental Health System
As indicated above,1 53 the 1979 ITA resulted in the virtual defacto
exclusion of voluntary patients 54 from the state's public mental
149. See E. GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS: ESSAYS ON THE SOCIAL SITUATION OF MENTAL PA-
TIENTS AND OTHER INMATES (1961); T. SZASZ, THE MANUFACTURE OF MADNESS: A COM-
PARATIVE STUDY OF THE INQUISITION AND ThE MENTAL HEALTH MOVEMENT (1970); R.
LERMAN, DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION AND THE WELFARE STATE (1982).
150. See E. GOFFMAN, supra note 149; T. SZASZ, supra note 149.
151. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON MENTAL HEALTH: REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT FROM
THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON MENTAL HEALTH (1978).
152. See supra Section IV.B.
153. See supra Section IV.A.
154. There is evidence that many patients admitted to state mental health facilities
as "voluntary patients" are in fact not willing patients at all, but rather are coerced to
apply for voluntary admission under threat either of involuntary commitment or arrest
for a criminal offense. Gilboy & Schmidt, Voluntary Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill, 66
Nw. U. L. REV. 429 (1971).
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health institutions. Consequently, many mentally ill individuals who
had recognized their illness and voluntarily sought institutional
treatment on past occasions could not receive such treatment after
1979.155
There is a significant body of literature which argues that treat-
ment is more effective when rendered on a voluntary basis.' 56 Pa-
tients who have sufficient insight into their condition to seek out
professional assistance may be precisely those most benefited by
treatment. As a result of the statutory changes, the Washington
State mental health system excluded those mentally ill patients for
whom its treatment might be most effective' 57 and included a new
group of patients for whom it might do the least good. 58 Policy-
makers must carefully consider whether this dramatic change in pa-
tient population resulted in the most efficient and effective expendi-
ture of limited state resources.
3. 'Demand' Exceeded 'Supply'
The state's institutional capacity could not accommodate the
number of patients for whom the state sought long-term commit-
155. Ironically, based on a study of patients admitted invountarily in 1974 to
Harborview Hospital in Seattle, two researchers concluded: "The Seattle experience
strongly suggests that if the needs of involuntary patients are appropriately addressed,
then treatment can be equal to or better than that of their voluntary counterparts..."
Sata & Goldenberg, A Study of Involuntary Patients in Seattle, 28 Hosp. & COMM. PSYCmA-
TRY 854 (1977).
It is possible, but unlikely, that voluntary patients sought care in the private sector,
including community mental health centers. Over 90 percent of the clients in this sam-
ple were unemployed at the time County Designated Mental Health Professionals made
their initial investigation for detention. Clients without income or health insurance are
unlikely to seek mental health services from private providers. Reduction in mental
health coverage from Medicaid during the study period in Washington State reduced the
availability of private mental health services even further. L.B.C., supra note 86, at 35.
156. See, Note, District of Columbia Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill, 65 COL. L. REV.
1062 (1965); Culver & Gert, The Mforality of Involuntar, Hospitalization, in THE LAW-
MEDICINE RELATION: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLORATION 159, 171 (S. SpickerJ. Healy & T.
Engelhardt eds. 1981); HOWELL, DIAMOND & WILKLER, Is THERE A CASE FOR VOLUNTARY
COMMITMENT? CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN BIOETHICS (T. Beauchamp & L. Walters 2d ed.
1982); Stein & Test, Alternative to W1ental Hospital Treatment, 37 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY
392 (1980); but see Cove & Fain, A Comparison of Voluntary and Committed Psychiatric Patients,
34 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY 669 (1977).
157. See notes 112-116 and accompanying text. By September 1983, the percentage
of voluntary admissions to mental institutions had dropped from a high of 66.1 percent
in late 1977 to approximately 3 percent of total civil admissions. See Pierce, Durham &
Fisher, supra note 114.
158. See supra notes 118-123. These data also suggest that persons who are consid-
ered "gravely disabled" may be less amenable to the treatment available in state mental
health facilities. It may be that such persons in fact suffer from problems in daily living





ment.' 59 In 1979, in response to the resultant flood of commit-
ments, Western State Hospital sought unsuccessfully to limit the
admission of involuntarily committed patients to its wards.'I ' In re-
vising the 1973 ITA, the state legislature did not appropriate ade-
quate additional funds' 6' to enable the state's public mental health
system to accommodate the increased number of patients generated
by the statutory change.' 62
The significant increase in patient population in the major public
mental health facilities without an equivalent allocation of additional
resources raises serious questions for policy-makers. In particular,
there is the distinct possibility that the sudden influx of additional
involuntary patients without sufficient resources effectively insured
that most patients were not receiving adequate and appropriate
care or treatment.' 6 3 Put bluntly, the state may have shifted to a
system in which "warehousing"164 rather than treatment became the
defacto ethos of commitment. Although no legal action was taken in
Washington, the circumstances were certainly ripe for lawsuits to be
filed seeking to enforce patients' rights to treatment.' 6 5
159. Seesupra note 103.
160. See supra note 104 and accompanying text. In Pierce County v. Western State Hospi-
tal, 97 Wash. 2d 264, 644 P.2d 131 (1982), the Washington Supreme Court held that
Western State Hospital was required by law to accept all patients who qualified for invol-
untary civil commitment regardless of the hospital's ability or capacity to accomodate
them.
161. See L.B.C., supra note 86, at 32.
162. The Washington State Supreme Court effectively required the public mental
health system to do the best it could with whatever resources were available. The court
refused to order WSH to provide adequate treatment to involuntarily committed pa-
tients or to order the state legislature to appropriate sufficient funding to permit WSH
to provide such treatment. The court evidently decided not to intervene directly in the
management of the state's major mental health facility as the federal district court had
done in Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
163. There is serious concern about whether state mental health facilities in general
provide even minimally adequate treatment services for the large number of involuntary
patients under their care. See Morse, supra note 8, at 79-84 and sources cited therein.
164. "Warehousing" is a term used to indicate that placement in a state hospital is
solely for custodial purposes without any significant benefit to those so confined other
than maintaining them at a minimal level of subsistence, including food, clothing, and
shelter.
165. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §71.05.360(2) (West Supp. 1985) provides that: "Each
person involuntarily detained or committed pursuant to this chapter shall have the right
to adequate care and individualized treatment." Nonetheless, the Washington Supreme
Court, in holding that Western State Hospital must accept persons committed to the
hospital for evaluation and treatment even if it did not have sufficient bed capacity to
accommodate such persons, acknowledged that such persons would not receive the
"right to adequate care and individualized treatment" required by the statute. Pierce
County v. Western State Hospital, 97 Wash. 2d 264, 268, 644 P.2d 131, 133-134 (1982).
The court concluded that "treatment delayed and inadequate must surely be better than
no treatment at all." Id. at 270, 644 P.2d at 134,
There has been a great deal of case law and commentary that forcefully suggests that
states must, as a constitutional imperative, provide some minimal level of effective treat-
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4. 7he Worst of Both Worlds
As indicated above, 166 the number of involuntary patients com-
mitted to public mental health facilites increased dramatically in
Washington just before and after enactment of the 1979 ITA. This
increase in unwilling patients outstripped the state's institutional ca-
pacity to house them, let alone treat them. 167 In all probability, the
system overload also resulted in these patients not receiving the
quality of treatment appropriate to their needs as mandated both by
statute and the Constitution.16 3 Moreover, mentally ill patients
(many of whom were indigent' 69) who voluntarily sought institu-
tional care from the state were largely excluded from state institu-
tions1 70 and were left to seek care and treatment as best they could.
These consequences were in large part attributable to two factors.
First, the legislature failed to appropriate the adequate additional
funding necessary to provide institutional care and treatment for the
increased patient demand for services generated by the 1979
ITA171 . Second, the Washington Supreme Court insisted that major
state mental health facilities continue to admit involuntary patients
regardless of bed capacity and staffing resources.
It is very likely, then, that Washington's public mental health sys-
tem provided inadequate treatment for most patients' 72 and provided
virtually no treatment for many patients who voluntarily sought insti-
tutional care for mental illness.
Any state legislature contemplating expanding the scope of the
state's commitment authority by revising the statutory commitment
criteria should seriously consider the fact that such action will gen-
erate a large number of additional patients within the state's mental
health facilities. It is essential that substantial additional funding for
mental health care and treatment in these facilities accompany any
such statutory change if the state legislature wishes to avoid a
mental health system that provides the worst of both worlds-inade-
ment to persons committed involuntarily for treatment, and that failure to provide such
treatment exposes the state and mental health officials to civil liability and other legal
sanctions. See, e.g., Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F.Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971); Speece, Preserv-
ing the Right to Treatment: A Critical Assessment and Constructive Development of Constitutional
Right to Treatment Theories, 20 ARZ. L. REV. 1 (1978); Katz, The Right to Treatment: An
Enchanting Legal Fiction, 36 U. Cui. L. REV. 755 (1969); Kaufman, The Right to Treatment
Suit as an Agent of Change, 136 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1428 (1979).
166. See supra notes 112-116 and accompanying text.
167. See supra notes 101-106 and accompanying text.
168. See supra note 165.
169. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 115-116 and accompanying text and Tables I and 2.
171. See supra note 91.
172. The Supreme Court of Washington virtually conceded this in its opinion in the




quate treatment for institutionalized patients and no treatment for
voluntary patients.
B. Implications for Effective Legal Regulation of the State's Coercive
System of Hospitalization
1. Controlling Bureaucracy
The impact of both the MacFarlane murder case and the "antici-
,pation effect' 173 call into question the adequacy of the legal sys-
tem's control over the state's involuntary commitment process. The
data suggest that administrative agencies to whom a limited power
had been delegated employed this power before they were permit-
ted to do so under the express terms of the legislative authorization.
Perhaps more importantly, the findings cast doubt on the ability
of the legal process to confine the exercise of delegated coercive
state power within the proper scope of the statutory authorization.
If the courts were applying the applicable statutory criteria, an in-
crease both in the number of commitments under the broadened
statutory criteria and in commitments based on grave disability
would have occurred following the effective date of the new statute
- not nine months prior to this date. In addition, these findings
strongly suggest that, at least for the brief period of time fromJanu-
ary 1, 1979, to September 1, 1979, the Washington involuntary
commitment system erred substantially on the side of "over-inclu-
siveness"' 74 and tolerated an unacceptably high number of "false-
positives" 7 5 given the statutory commitment criteria then in effect.
Arguably, a significant number of patients may have been commit-
ted as "gravely disabled" who in fact did not meet the legal criteria
in effect prior to September 1, 1979.
The data also suggest that during the nine-month period prior to
September 1, 1979, the judiciary was excessively deferential to the
judgments of experts who recommended hospitalization of patients
who did not meet the more restrictive criteria still in effect.' 76 In
173. See supra notes 112-116 and accompanying text.
174. "Over-inclusiveness" refers to the commitment of persons who in fact do not
meet the relevent criteria for coerced hospitalization but are confined anyway due to
erroneous evaluation or decision-making.
175. "False-positives" in this context refers to the number of persons falsely deter-
mined in the commitment process to be mentally ill and either gravely disabled or
presenting a likelihood of serious harm to others or themselves. In common parlance
the term refers to the number of "mistakes" made in involuntary commitment.
176. See generally, Hiday, Court Decisions in Civil Commitment: Independence or Deference, 4
INT. J. L. PSYCHIATRY 159 (1981); Hiday, Reformed Commitment Procedures: An Empirical
Study in the Courtroom, II L. & Soc'v 654 (1977); Lipsett & Lelos, Decision Makers in Law
and Psychiatry and the Involuntary Commitment Process, 17 AMER. MENTAL HEALTH J. 114
(1981); Zander, Civil Commitment in Wisconsin: The Impact of Lessard v. Schmidt, 1976 Wis.
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the absence of such judicial behavior, it would have been reasonable
to expect a more stable increase in the rate of commitments as
"gravely disabled" rather than the sudden surge that occurred. 77
In any event, this empirical evidence provides a basis for concern
that during this period the judicial system failed to protect against
unwarranted loss of personal liberty and other civil rights due to
inappropriate commitment.
There can be no doubt that both the 1973 ITA and the 1979 ITA
allocated final commitment authority to a judicial officer in the case
of the 14-day commitment 7 8 and to a jury in the case of a 90- or
180-day commitment.' 79 This assignment of responsibility demon-
strates a clear policy choice by the legislature that the decision to
commit a person to a mental health facility is ultimately a legal deci-
sion and not solely a medical one.' 80 Medical testimony is certainly
relevant to the decision, but it is not to be substituted for the legal
determination. To the extent that medical testimony, and implicitly,
medical standards, are coextensive with the legal criteria for com-
mitment, undue reliance on the expert and on his opinion may be
encouraged in the decision-making process.
This problem has also manifested itself in the criminal justice
system when the defense of insanity has been litigated.' 8' Revi-
sions of state commitment statutes which define commitment crite-
L. REV. 503 (1976); Litwack, The Role of Counsel in Involuntary Civil Commitment Proceedings,
62 CALIF. L. REv. 816 (1974). There is strong empirical evidence which suggests that
even when a state enacts significantly more restrictive commitment criteria, the commit-
ting authorities still defer to the judgments of mental health professionals and, conse-
quently, many persons are committed who in fact do not meet the stringent commitment
standards. Comment, Involuntary Hospitalization, supra note 27.
There may be some benefits from judicial deference to expert testimony. For in-
stance, some patients committed to mental health facilities against their will may, after a
course of treatment, be benefitted by such state intervention. See A. STONE, supra note
27. And, in close cases, doubt might be resolved in favor of treatment rather than in
favor of liberty. ChiefJustice Burger has expressed the opinion in Addington v. Texas, 441
U.S. 418, 430 (1979) that: "It cannot be said ... that it is much better for a mentally ill
person to 'go free' than for a mentally normal person to be committed." It seems incon-
trovertible, however, that the stringent procedures and specific allocation to judicial au-
thority of responsibility for the commitment decision provided for both in the 1973 ITA
and 1979 ITA were intended by the Washington state legislature to prevent inappropri-
ate commitment. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.05.020 (West 1975).
177. It may be that courts were also anticipating the implementation of the revised
commitment criteria. In theory, of course, courts are supposed to apply the law in effect
at the time of decision and not to anticipate changes in the law.
178. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
179. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
180. Comment, Progress in Involuntary Commitment, 49 WASH. L. REV. 617 (1974).
181. See, e.g., United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Washington
v. United States, 390 F.2d 444 (D.C. Cir. 1967) and Appendix thereto (setting forth
instructions which state the appropriate role of an expert witness when insanity is an




ria in terms similar to those used for medical diagnosis may well
invite the same confusion of roles as has been experienced in the
criminal justice system. Moreover, suffusing legal standards with
medical terminology makes the task of counsel for the patient even
more difficult because she is faced with disproving a medical diagno-
sis rather than focusing on the impact the alleged medical illness has
on the patient's ability to live outside an institution.
The prolonged duration of forced hospitalization referred to
above18 2 also raises a question of fundamental import to policy-
makers and legislators: are courts in fact capable of effectively re-
viewing the continued and prolonged confinement of persons who
are committed as gravely disabled with cognitive or volitional
impairment?
In addition, the overcrowding of the state's mental health facilities
after enactment of the 1979 ITA,183 the longer duration of average
patient stays in confinement, 8 4 and the increased occurence of re-
cidivist admissions 8 5 cast doubt on whether patients were receiving
the appropriate treatment to which they were clearly entitled under
Washington law. 18 6 These facts suggest that the internal adminis-
trative apparatus designed to ensure that patient rights are pro-
tected within public mental health facilities' 87 may not have
functioned effectively to enforce their right to treatment.
2. Control Mechanisms: Standards or Procedures?
As previously discussed,' 8 8 in the past two decades there have
been important changes in state commitment statutes designed to
alter the ways in which mental health systems work. Initially these
adjustments included restrictive commitment criteria and additional
procedural safeguards for committees.' 89  More recently, some
states have expanded commitment criteria' 90 and provided less
stringent procedural protection. 19' There have been conflicting
182. See supra Section IV.B. 1.
183. See supra notes 101-106 and accompanying text.
184. See supra Section IV.B.I.
185. See supra notes 118-123 and accompanying text.
186. See supra note 165.
187. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §70.124. el seq. (West Supp. 1984) provides a statutory
scheme for mandatory reporting and investigation of alleged instances of patient abuse
or neglect in state hospitals either to law enforcement agencies or to the State Depart-
ment of Social and Health Services.
188. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
189. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
190. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
191. See, e.g., TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-49(a) (Vernon Supp. 1985) (cur-
rent statute provides a hearing before a court unless jury trial is requested; prior to 1983
amendment, art. 5547-49(e) automatically provided for a jury trial unless waived).
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views expressed on whether changes either in commitment crite-
ria' 92 or in procedural safeguards 93 make any real difference in the
operation of public systems of involuntary civil commitment.
Some commentators have argued that commitment procedures
are much more influential than the standards for commitment in de-
terinining the likelihood of commitment. 94 Others assert that stat-
utes adopting more restrictive commitment criteria and providing
additional procedural safeguards do not significantly change the
number of patients or the relative percentage of patients admitted
involuntarily into public mental health facilities.' 95 More recent
studies indicate that alternative formulations of commitment criteria
(stressing police power commitment based on dangerousness as
opposed to stressing parens patriae treatment of seriously ill pa-
tients) would probably not result in significant differences either in
the number or identity of patients committed involuntarily.' 96
Thus, there is substantial skepticism that statutory revisions of
either a substantive or a procedural nature can in practice determine
the number or kinds of patients committed involuntarily.
In light of this controversy, the 1979 ITA and the impact it
wrought in commitment practices may be of special significance.
Except for two minor changes discussed above,1 97 this statute
broadened the criteria for commitment while leaving the procedural
safeguards provided committees unchanged. As the study makes
clear,198 expanding the scope of the state's authority to commit
through broader commitment criteria resulted in a substantial in-
crease in the number and kind of patients committed involuntarily
to state public mental health facilities. It seems likely, then, that
mental health professionals will use expanded commitment author-
ity to include patients in the involuntary mental health system whom
they had not previously included. It may be that restrictive commit-
ment criteria do not necessarily operate to limit the population of
involuntarily committed patients. It may also be that procedural
safeguards, rather than commitment criteria, is a more relevant vari-
192. Compare, e.g., Monahan, Ruggiero & Friedlander, Stone-Roth Model of Civil Com-
mitment and the California Dangerousness Standard, 39 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY 1267 (1982)
with Comment, Involuntary Hospitalization, supra note 27.
193. See, e.g., Faulkner, Bloom & Kundahl-Stanley, Effects of a New Involuntary Commit-
ment Law: Expectations and Reality, 10 AAPL BULL. 249 (1983); Comment, Involuntary Hos-
pitalization, supra note 27.
194. See Roth, supra note 21, at 391.
195. See Comment, Involuntary Hospitalization, supra note 27; but see Stromberg &
Stone, supra note 22.
196. Monahan, Ruggiero & Friedlander, supra note 192.
197. See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.




able in explaining the level and nature of involuntary commitment.
Both of these hypotheses, however, await further empirical study.
3. Multiple Commitment Grounds
As noted above,' 9 9 the 1979 ITA not only resulted in an in-
creased involuntary patient population in the public mental health
system, but it also provided CDMHPs and hospital staff with ex-
panded power to commit and retain patients. In addition, the study
clearly indicates that committing personnel relied increasingly on
multiple grounds to justify commitment.200
This practice has implications for judicial control of the commit-
ment process. In particular this practice makes it more difficult for
courts to decide at each of the statutorily specified instances ofjudi-
cial review whether to continue to retain a patient in confine-
ment.20 ' Since each of the criteria for commitment 20 2 is an
independent or sufficient ground for initial or continued confine-
ment of a patient, the use of multiple grounds by mental health pro-
fessionals to justify corrmitment and retention increases the
likelihood that ajudge orjury203 will agree with a mental health pro-
fessional's decision to commit or retain. The data compiled to date
tend to substantiate this hypothesis.
4. The Impact of Structural Arrangements for Providing Counsel
This research also provided an opportunity to explore whether
structural arrangements 20 4 for providing legal representation for
patients make a significant difference in litigation outcomes during
the commitment process. Most studies to date have focused on how
much time is spent conducting a formal commitment hearing 20 5 or
on whether attorneys act as advocates zealously asserting the ex-
199. See supra notes 118-119 and accompanying text.
200. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
201. See Table 5.
202. See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
203. See supra notes 64-69 and accompanying text.
204. "Structural arrangements" refers to the formal method by which counsel is
provided indigent committees. See infra notes 205-209 and accompanying text.
205. See, e.g., L.B.C., supra note 86, at 41. See generally Hiday, The Attorney's Role in
Involuntary Civil Commitment, 60 N.C.L. REV. 1027 (1982); Note, The Role of Counsel in the
Civil Commitment Process: A Theoretical Framework, 84 YALE L.J. 1540 (1975); A.B.A. COM-
MISSION ON THE MENTALLY DISABLED, LEGAL ISSUES IN STATE MENTAL HEALTH CARE'S
PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE 286 (1981).
A recent study revealed that most legal counsel appointed to represent indigents at
commitment hearings were unclear of whether to assume a guardian role or an advocate
role when representing clients alleged to be mentally ill. Attorneys who were inter-
viewed were likely to identify their role as that of an advocate (i.e., protecting the due
process rights of a patient and acting as his representative), although their description of
their legal activities more closely matched that of a guardian (i.e., acting in the best
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pressed wishes of their client, or, alternatively, act as guardians ad
litem pursuing the best interests of the the client as perceived by the
attorney.20 6
Two adjacent counties in the State of Washington, King County
and Pierce County, which account for 40 percent of all involuntary
commitments in the state,20 7 use very different systems of providing
indigent defendants with legal representation. The data clearly indi-
cate that patients represented by counsel appointed from an ap-
proved list on a rotating basis are almost always committed at
contested 14-day hearings and at 90-day hearings.20 8 In sharp con-
trast, patients represented by public defender attorneys, who ac-
quire expertise, retain significant contact with their clients, and are
not subject to review by public authorities for their time charges,
fare much better in resisting continued civil commitment.20 9
Of course, there may be a number of causal explanations for such
extreme discrepancies in litigation outcomes in the two adjacent
interest of the client as perceived by the attorney, even if counter to the patient's ex-
pressed wishes). L.B.C., supra note 86, at 41.
In a rather candid analysis, two authors contend that, when attorneys representing
patients act as guardian ad litem rather than as zealous advocates for freedom, patients
have been committed even when examining physicians recommend against commitment.
See Miller & Fiddleman, supra note 82, at 1003-1004. It cannot be disputed that zealous
advocacy is essential if procedural and substantive protections are to work effectively in
the commitment system. See also Quesnell v. State of Washington, 83 Wash. 2d 24, 517
P.2d 568 (1973) (attorney for involuntary civil committee must act as zealous advocate
for client and not waive any fundamental rights without the consent of the client).
206. L.B.C., supra note 86, at 41.
207. See supra Section III.C.
208. As Table 5 shows, the prosecuting attorney in Pierce County wins 95.6 percent
of contested cases at the 14-day hearings, and 91.2 percent of contested cases at the 90-
day hearings.
209. Prosecutors in King County succeed in committing far fewer patients for deten-
tion to inpatient institutional care; only 71.5 percent of their cases result in such deten-
tion, while 15.9 percent of the patients are committed to less restrictive alternatives.
Almost 13 percent of the patients are released outright at 14-day hearings in King
County.
Litigation outcomes at 90-day hearings reveal an even more stark contrast. In Pierce
County, appointed counsel wins outright release in contested cases in only 1.4 percent
of the 90-day hearings. In King County, patients obtain outright release in 14.7 percent
of contested cases at the 90-day hearings. Viewed from their perspective, patients in
King County are II times more likely to obtain release at this juncture than are patients
in Pierce County.
The same pattern is manifested in measuring whether patients obtain less restrictive
commitments at the 90-day hearing. In Pierce County, patients obtain less restrictive
placement in 7.4 percent of the contested cases. In King County, patients obtain place-
ment in a less restrictive alternative in almost 42 percent of the contested cases. Put
more starkly, in Pierce County 91.2 percent of all patients are committed to Western
State Hospital for 90 days in inpatient institutional confinement compared with 43.3
percent of all patients in King County. Thus, the chance of obtaining a less retrictive
placement in King County is almost six times greater than in Pierce County.
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counties.2 10 The data nonetheless provide very strong evidence that
the structural arrangements for providing legal representation for
committees are crucial in determining litigation outcomes. It is
quite likely that attorney expertise makes a significant difference in
litigation involving special areas of knowledge such as mental
health.21' Attorneys who practice in the mental health field for sev-
eral years, and who are associated with others also practicing in that
field, are more likely to develop special competence. Conversely,
attorneys, many of whom have been recently admitted to the bar,
who practice only occasionally in the mental health field are unlikely
to acquire expertise in the field. 21 2
Some commentators suggest that public defender representation
of indigent committees provides a superior defense function than
does representation by attorneys appointed from a volunteer list.
They argue that public defender or legal service representation
would have three advantages: 1) public defense attorneys "are pre-
sumably less subject to social and professional pressures that appar-
ently prevent members of the private bar from undertaking an
aggressive defense in commitment cases"; 2) their lawyers would
"become more experienced in their defense work and . . . [would]
gain some expertise in mental health law and commitment defense";
and, 3) they would "tend to cultivate a strong communal feeling
with one another. '" 213
The data raise serious questions as to whether some mentally ill
persons represented at commitment proceedings by attorneys ap-
pointed by the court from a county commisioner-approved list are
receiving the quality and competency of representation mandated
under the Constitution.2 1 4 It is clear that citizens threatened with
the loss of liberty and other civil rights are constitutionally entitled
to the effective assistance of counsel at commitment proceedings.2 1 5
210. It is possible that differences in the patient populations, the demographic fac-
tors, the discretion the C.D.M.H.P. has in filing commitment petitions, the attitudes of
judges, magistrates, or juries, and other variables also explain the differences in
outcomes.
211. Judge David Bazelon has suggested: "'Ideally, there should be a specialized,
experienced bar skilled in legal problems revolving about mental illness." Thornton v.
Corcoran, 407 F.2d 695, 702 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
212. See generally L.B.C., supra note 86, at 41-45.
213. Comment, Involuntary Hospitalization, supra note 27, at 1422.
214. Strickland v. Washington, - U.S. - 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984); United States v.
De Coster, 487 F.2d 1197 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Quesnell v. Washington, 83 Wash. 2d 224,
517 P.2d 568 (1973).
215. See, e.g., Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and
remanded, 414 U.S. 473 (1974), order on remand, 379 F. Supp. 1376 (1974), vacated and
remandedon other grounds, 421 U.S. 957 (1975), order reinstatedon remand, 413 F. Supp. 1318
(1976); Denton v. Commonwealth, 383 S.W.2d 681 (Ky. 1964); State of Oregon v. Coil-
man, 9 Or. App. 476, 497 P.2d 1233 (1972).
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Effective representation is especially critical when the state, in seek-
ing involuntary civil commitment, is indirectly asserting that the.pa-
tient lacks competence to make important decisions on his own
behalf.2 16
The litigation outcomes also raise significant questions of sub-
stantive due process. As the Supreme Court stated in Jackson v. Indi-
ana, "[alt the least, due process requires that the nature and duration
of commitment bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for
which the individual is committed." 2 17 This "rule of reason" has
generated case law 2 18 and commentary2 l9 which conclude that per-
sons should suffer no greater loss of liberty than is necessary to ac-
complish the legitimate state purposes being furthered. In the area
of civil commitment, this rule of reason has been generally articu-
lated as the "least restrictive alternative" doctrine. 220  Many
states,22' including Washington, 2 22 mandate that patients being
committed involuntarily be placed in the least restrictive alternative
available.
The data clearly indicate that many more patients secure place-
ment in a less restrictive alternative when detained in a county
where a public defender is provided than in a county where patients
are represented by appointed counsel. 223 This in turn suggests that
216. See, e.g., Chodoff, supra note 5; Slovenko, Civil Commitment in Perspective, 20 J.
PUB. L. 3 (1971); Katz, supra note 21.
217. 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972) (emphasis supplied).
218. See, e.g., Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982) (a dangerous mentally re-
tarded person is constitutionally entitled to reasonable care and safety and may be de-
prived of no more liberty than is reasonably necessary to accomplish that objective);
Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836 (3rd Cir. 1981), vacated and remanded, 458 U.S. 1119 (1982)
(an involuntarily committed mental patient has a constitutional right to refuse anti-
psychotic drugs unless administration of these drugs is, in the exercise of professional
judgment, deemed necessary to prevent danger to the patient or others); Johnson by
Johnson v. Brelje, 701 F.2d 1201 (7th Cir. 1983) (a civilly committed mental patient has
a constitutionally protected right to move about).
219. See, e.g., La Fond, Purposes of Commitment, supra note 2.
220. See generally Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 863 (1965); Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378 (M.D. Ala. 1974), rev'd, 651 F.2d 387
(5th Cir. 1981); Developments - Civil Commitment, supra note 1, at 1240-49; Speece, Preserv-
ing the Right to Treatment: A Critical Assessment and Constructive Development of Constitutional
Right to Treatment Theories, 20 ARIz. L. REV. 1 (1978); Hoffman & Foust, Least Restrictive
Treatment of the Mentally Ill: A Doctrine in Search of its Senses, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1100
(1977); Chambers, Alternative to Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Practical Guides and
Constitutional Imperatives, 70 MICH. L. REV. 1108 (1972).
221. See, e.g., ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-B §3801(4)(A) (Supp. 1984); N.M. STAT.
ANN. §43-1-11 (D) (1984); UTAH CODE ANN. §64-7-36(10)(d) (Supp. 1983); VA. CODE
§37.1-67.3 (1984); Wis. STAT. ANN. §51.20(l)(c) (West Supp. 1984).
222. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §70.05.240 (West Supp. 1984).
223. See supra notes 131-133 and 208-209 and accompanying text and Table 5.
Other researchers have shown that ignorance of community alternatives to involuntary
hospitalization is significant in determining whether patients are civilly committed. Sol-




many patients are being deprived completely of their liberty when
placement in a less restrictive alternative would suffice to accom-
plish the state's purpose in seeking commitment. While there may
be other explanations for this discrepancy between counties, includ-
ing the availability of less restrictive placement facilities, availability
of long-term institutionalization, the assistance of specialists in lo-
cating these less restrictive placements, and funding arrange-
ments;2 2 4 the data are consistent with the conclusion that specialized
attorneys who practice in association in the mental health field and
who have more information about and assistance in securing avail-
able opportunities for less restrictive placements provide signifi-
cantly more effective representation than their court-appointed
counterparts.
The study raises disturbing questions about the impact structural
arrangements for legal representation have on the efficacy and qual-
ity of the defense function in commitment proceedings. Compared
with patients represented by public defender agencies, patients rep-
resented by appointed counsel not only lose much more frequently
in all instances of contested commitment proceedings, but also are
confined much more frequently as inpatients to mental health facili-
ties rather than placed in less restrictive environments.
Conclusion
During the 1960's and 1970's, many states enacted restrictive civil
commitment statutes for involuntary hospitalization of the mentally
ill. These statutes contained narrow commitment criteria and strin-
gent procedural protections that made it more difficult than under
prior commitment statutes to confine persons considered mentally
ill and in need of treatment. Currently, powerful forces are arguing
TRY 405 (1981). Attorneys without practice experience in the mental health field are
unlikely to be aware of such alternatives. During the period of our study, however, the
Seattle-King County Defender Association in Seattle employed social workers who were
familiar with placement alternatives in the community. A portion of one social worker's
time was allocated to the Civil Commitment Division specifically for assistance in locat-
ing less restrictive courses of treatment. In addition, the Defender Association in King
County will, in selected cases where the state is seeking a 90 or 180 day commitment,
request the court to appoint a professional person to seek less restrictive alternative
courses of treatment and to testify on behalf of the committee as authorized by WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. §71.05.300. The court in King County has always granted such re-
quests. The individual appointed is a professional person in private practice who is
knowledgeable about treatment alternatives in the community. Interview with John H.
Hertog, Jr., The Defender Association, in Seattle, Washington (February 20, 1985).
224. In Washington, the state will not pay for "least restrictive alternative" place-
ment beyond 14 days. Consequently, there are significant incentives for counties to seek
long-term care for involuntary commitment in state hospitals rather than in out-patient
or other least restrictive placements. See supra notes 105-106 and accompanying text.
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persuasively that these restrictive commitment statutes condemn
many mentally ill individuals to lives of abject misery outside appro-
priate institutions, and that timely intervention by the state, while
coercive, would restore these individuals to a more productive and
humane life. The American Psychiatric Association has adopted a
model statute that would expand the power of the state to commit
persons not presently commitable under most state statutes. Wash-
ington, Alaska, Texas, and North Carolina have enacted statutes
that accomplish this objective. Other state legislatures will surely
consider similar legislation. It is imperative that policy-makers in-
volved in these decisions consider carefully the consequences and
implications of such legislation.
This study provides strong empirical evidence that revising statu-
tory commitment criteria to expand the state's authority to confine
and treat mentally ill persons for therapeutic purposes will signifi-
cantly increase the number of individuals involuntarily committed to
psychiatric facilities. Many of these persons will be new entrants
into the coercive public mental health system and many of them will
return to the system on a regular basis. Without adequate addi-
tional resources, other mentally ill persons, most of whom are prob-
ably indigent, who had previously sought and received inpatient
care and treatment from the public mental health system on a volun-
tary basis will be unable to obtain these services and will be left to
fend for themselves as best they can. Enacting a civil commitment
statute that expands the power of the state to commit mentally ill
persons for therapeutic purposes also raises the strong possibility
that a large number of persons will become institutionally depen-
dent for the first time in their lives. Many of these patients may well
become chronic users of state psychiatric hospitals. Serious consid-
eration should be given to whether more effective treatment can be
provided through community care than through institutionalization.
This study also warns that, if a state legislature is determined to
expand dramatically the reach of the involuntary civil commitment
system, it must at the same time appropriate adequate additional
resources if it is to have any hope of achieving the therapeutic pur-
poses sought. Failure to provide sufficient funding for such a legis-
lative initiative could result in overcrowded state mental health
institutions with potentially harmful consequences to patients.
A strong case can also be made that any statutory proposal to ex-
pand the commitment authority of the state should contain detailed




sponding level of increased resources necessary to provide effective
care and treatment for these patients. 225 Such a projection would
then make explicit the costs of fully funding such a legislative initia-
tive and provide a basis for comparing alternative solutions to the
perceived problem. 226 If such funding is not included in the pro-
posed legislation, those professional and other organizations pro-
mooting expansion of the state's commitment authority would have
to face the ethical dilemma of supporting increased coercive hospi-
talization of the mentally ill fully aware of the probable adverse con-
sequences an inadequately funded commitment scheme will have on
the very individuals they seek to help. It is no longer clear that the
American Psychiatric Association and others who have a genuine in-
terest in the welfare of the mentally ill can responsibly and ethically
support the expansion of state involuntary commitment schemes
without insisting upon clearly adequate funding as a necessary con-
dition of any such enactment.2 27
The data collected in this study also raise grave doubts about the
legal system's capacity to monitor and control the delegation of the
state's power of coercive confinement and treatment to mental
health bureaucrats. Washington State bureaucrats charged with ini-
tiating commitment of the mentally ill seemingly anticipated a statu-
tory grant of expanded commitment authority by at least nine
months. Courts charged by statute with final responsibility for com-
mitment did not effectively prevent such usurpation of legal author-
ity. The new commitment criterion for therapeutic commitment
contained in the 1979 ITA was used liberally by mental health pro-
fessionals. This new ground, suffused with medical terms of art,
also seemed to encourage significant judicial deference to the opin-
ions of mental health experts and to make the task of defense coun-
sel more difficult in contested commitment proceedings. Under the
1979 ITA, mandatory periodic judicial review had less impact than
225. I will undoubtedly be difficult to generate precise projections of patient loads
and resource needs. However, the experience in Washington State should provide a
point of departure for constructing adequate predictive models. Further experience in
other states may also shed light on the problem. It is imperative, however, that policy-
makers develop an accurate systemic approach to estimating true "costs" in state invol-
untary commitment schemes to avoid the type of situation which occurred in Washing-
Ion State as a result of the passage of the 1979 ITA.
226. Cost-benefit analysis of the various alternatives could then be done with more
useful and complete data available.
227. Such an inadequately funded commitment system might well violate a funda-
mental ethical tenet of the medical profession, the oath of Hypocrates, which provides in
part: "I will prescribe my regime for the good of my patients according to my ability and
my judgment and never do harm to anyone." STEADMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 650 (5th
ed. 1982) (emphasis added).
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legislators might have assumed in effectively insuring that persons
committed to mental health facilities were released or placed in less
restrictive alternatives when their condition no longer warranted
continued retention in state hospitals. 228 In addition, the data sug-
gest that structural arrangements for providing counsel for involun-
tary committees significantly affect the outcomes of judicial
commitment proceedings.
The fierce debate over involuntary civil commitment will un-
doubtedly continue. It is an area of the law especially influenced by
the ebb and flow of public sentiment about the appropriate role of
the state in pursuing the collectivist goal of preserving community
security and the humanitarian goal of providing care for individuals
who may need psychiatric treatment. As a system of social control
that seeks to realize these goals, involuntary civil commitment must
be evaluated in light of the findings of this study.
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228. See Note, Procedural Safeguards for Periodic Review: A New Commitment to MenteI Pa-
tient's Rights, 88 YALE LJ. 850 (1979).
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